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Abstract 
 
Nina S. Russell: Moving the needle: 
How price and quality transparency could lower costs and improve quality  
in United States hospitals 
 
This thesis shows the limitations of price and quality information for 
improving the value of healthcare.1 First, in four survey experiments to determine 
the impact of information on decision-making, consumers were more likely to 
choose the lower cost or higher quality option when relevant information was 
presented in straightforward ways with a minimized risk of information overload (n 
= 224, t = -3.7065, p < 0.0002). Second, hospitals on the U.S. News Best Hospital 
list between 2008 and 2011 were shown to be significantly more likely to be found in 
wealthy, highly populated areas, while unranked hospitals were more likely to be the 
sole community provider. Third, perceived quality (U.S. News-ranked hospitals) was 
shown to be out of alignment with actual quality (hospitals performing above the 
national average for readmission and mortality according to Medicare Hospital 
Compare): 36 hospitals performed well on both lists, constituting only 0.77% of total 
hospitals in the U.S. in 2011.  
Current efforts have not gone far enough toward complete transparency to 
lead to negative effects such as collusion, nor to positive effects such as better value. 
Fears held by economists and private sector participants will likely not be realized in 
the near future—but neither will the hopes of policymakers for demand-driven 
change in the healthcare system. 
 
                                            
1 In this context, “value” denotes the relationship of price to quality, where a high quality to cost ratio 
is of good value. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction to transparency 
 
Chapter 1 begins by outlining problems in the United States healthcare 
market—namely, high costs and low quality. Next, it presents the case for 
transparency as a demand-side and supply-side solution to these problems. Finally, it 
highlights the main risks of transparency, such as the threat of collusion leading to 
higher prices across the board. 
Healthcare in the U.S. is too costly. U.S. healthcare spending in 2010 was 
17.7 percent of GDP (Bank, 2015). Such high spending may not seem unreasonable 
until we compare the U.S. to its peer countries. In 2010, the OECD average for 
healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP was 9.5 percent (Lafortune, 2012). One 
might hope that, because the U.S. is spending more than its peers, what it is receiving 
is worth the premium price. 
To the contrary, healthcare quality in the U.S. does not appear to merit the 
cost. Among 19 countries included in a 2008 study of amenable mortality, the United 
States had the highest rate of deaths from conditions that could have been prevented 
or treated successfully (Nolte & McKee, 2008). Americans receive appropriate, 
evidence-based care when they need it only 55 percent of the time (NCQA, 2007). 
Tens of thousands of Americans die each year as a result of preventable hospital 
errors (NCQA, 2007). Furthermore, too much is currently being spent on the wrong 
types of care. Adult patients in the U.S. receive only about half of the care 
recommended for their condition, yet nearly 30 percent of the care delivered each 
year is for services that may not improve patient health (RWJF, 2015).  
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It is clear that we ought to combat the trend of the U.S. spending too much 
and getting too little, for ethical reasons (people’s lives are at stake) and for economic 
ones (this is an inefficient market). The U.S. healthcare market is rife with 
misallocated resources that could be fixed by a realignment of incentives to prioritize 
value over volume.  
Price and quality transparency could be the answer. First, transparency could 
cause providers to improve their own performance relative to benchmarking for 
price and quality. Second, transparency could lead to competition on the basis of 
price and quality, thereby driving positive change throughout the market. Finally, 
transparency could provide consumers with the information necessary to choose 
low-cost, high-quality options, thereby channeling clientele and revenue toward 
hospitals that are providing better value. 
Transparency relies upon the Internet’s ability to communicate large amounts 
of up-to-date information in ways that are tailored to the end user. Just as consumers 
evaluate restaurants on Yelp, so, too, can patients now post a review of their 
physician on Healthgrades.  
Transparency in healthcare pricing and quality is popular with policymakers 
partly due to the persuasiveness of philosophical and economic arguments for 
patients to have full information. From a philosophical standpoint, to enable 
consumers to have full information is laudable in the context of individual 
autonomy. From an economic standpoint, transparency seems poised to enable an 
efficient healthcare market: with more information available, consumers, providers, 
and payers can make better decisions, enabling both supply-side and demand-side 
change. In a market struggling under the excess costs incurred by supply-sensitive 
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care—which accounts for more than half of all Medicare spending2—transparency 
could provide consumers with the information they need to use the “just right” 
amount of healthcare, thereby reducing costs.  
However, varying philosophical conceptions of patients and competing 
economic interests mean that legislation can result in the assembly of information 
that is designed for policymakers rather than consumers.3 Providing policymakers 
with more information can be valuable for improving public health policy4 and 
facilitating supply-side change. An example of a supply-side attempt to mitigate rising 
healthcare costs in the U.S. is the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) 
Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program. In October 2014, CMS began 
cutting Medicare payments for hospitals that perform poorly with respect to 
hospital-acquired conditions (Medicare, 2015b). However, supply-side policies are 
ought not be implemented instead of demand-side ones merely because private 
payers and providers are afraid of airing their dirty laundry. 
                                            
2 According to the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, “Supply-sensitive care refers to services where 
the supply of a specific resource has a major influence on utilization rates. The frequency of use of 
supply-sensitive care is not determined by well-articulated medical theory, much less by scientific 
evidence; rather, it is largely due to differences in local capacity, and a payment system that ensures 
that existing capacity remains fully deployed. Simply put, in regions where there are more hospital 
beds per capita, patients will be more likely to be admitted to the hospital. In regions where there are 
more intensive care unit beds, more patients will be cared for in the ICU. More specialists will result 
in more visits to specialists. And the more CT scanners are available, the more CT scans patients will 
receive” (T. D. A. o. H. Care, 2015). 
3 In an analysis of 174 pieces of legislation passed in 45 states between 1956 and 2013, 107 out of 
explicitly required the reporting of price information to the general public (often through the state 
government), while 120 required the reporting of information solely to the state government. The 
remainder imposed requirements on payers and providers to make information available on their own 
(sources of information: Delbanco, 2014; NCSL, 2015a; analysis mine). 
4 Policymakers can use data on overall pricing to regulate prices directly or to pursue alternate 
methods of increasing the degree of price competition. In his 2013 statement before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Finance, Paul B. Ginsburg describes the three distinct audiences that have the potential 
to benefit from healthcare price information. Besides indicating the role of policymakers in regulating 
competition and prices, he also highlights the audiences of (1) individual patients and (2) employers 
purchasing health benefits for their employees (Finance, 2013). 
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One defense of transparency is a values-based argument holding that 
transparency is a core value of our society. On this view, we believe that the public 
or individual consumers should know about the products and services they are 
buying and what they cost, even if someone else is paying (i.e., an insurer, Medicare, 
or Medicaid). While this perspective is valuable, this paper focuses on concrete policy 
implications of transparency, specifically relating to its feasibility. 
Another supporting argument for transparency is utilitarian: we ought to use 
transparency to promote high-value healthcare. I have already referred to the three 
mechanisms by which this might take place: providers improving their own 
performance due to benchmarking; competition on the basis of price and quality; 
and consumers choosing low-cost, high-quality options.  
Yet, there are risks to implementing transparency. The healthcare market in 
the U.S. is far from perfectly competitive, with economies of scale for payers and 
providers. As a result, it is possible that publication of prices may allow firms to 
reduce the intensity of oligopoly price competition, as occurred in Denmark’s ready-
mixed concrete market when the Danish antitrust authority published firm-specific 
transaction prices in 1993 (Overgaard, Møllgaard, & Albæk, 1997). Whereas firms 
had been cutting deals before the legislation, in 1993 they saw an opportunity to hike 
up prices, which led to convergence at a higher price point (Overgaard et al., 1997). 
The risk of price inflation means that healthcare consumers could end up worse off 
than before transparency legislation.  
Transparency also poses risks to quality. If the measures for quality are not 
chosen properly, we may see negative consequences for the quality of care and 
adverse effects on health worker motivation and performance. Stimulation of certain 
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efforts by public reporting may discourage efforts on aspects of healthcare 
performance that are not measured (de Bruin, Baan, & Struijs, 2011). Further risks to 
quality include the possibility of false reporting; providers cherry-picking patients to 
meet targets more easily; increased inequity due to the rewarding of providers and 
facilities that are in a better position to meet targets; and dilution of intrinsic 
motivation (Ireland, Paul, & Dujardin, 2011). While these are valid concerns, they 
could be reduced by careful selection of performance measures. For example, the 
risk of healthcare workers “treating to the test” (focusing on aspects of health that 
are being measured) seems possible to mitigate by ensuring that the “test” includes 
every aspect of health that we care about. 
Furthermore, a broader risk that faces all policy decisions is the chance that 
the amount spent implementing price and quality transparency will not be made up 
for in lower prices and higher quality. Measuring and reporting takes resources, on 
the part of providers, payers, and the government, and overregulation can stifle the 
private sector. For example, in its June 18, 2013 statement before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Finance, the American Hospital Association writes: 
Nationally, hospitals deal with more than 1,300 insurers, each having 
different plans, all with multiple and often unique requirements for 
hospital bills. Add to that decades of governmental regulations that 
have made a complex billing system even more complex and 
frustrating for everyone involved. In fact, Medicare rules and 
regulations alone top more than 130,000 pages, much of which is 
devoted to submitting bills for payment. Clearly, this is an 
unworkable system. (Finance, 2013) 
 
Transparency runs the risk of piling on more paperwork without realizing returns. 
Given these concerns, this thesis addresses the feasibility of implementing 
transparency, given current efforts. It seeks to understand how healthcare reform 
efforts could best raise quality and lower costs. In Chapter 2, I lay out a theory of 
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transparency, arguing that we ought to understand the behavior of healthcare 
consumers through the lens of bounded rationality. Chapters 3 and 4 present the 
current state of affairs for price and quality transparency (respectively) in the U.S. 
hospital market. The literature includes a lack of conclusive evidence that 
transparency drives change in hospital price and quality. The case studies of 
legislation confirm that members of both parties have pushed for transparency, but 
also highlight the ways in which current legislation does not go far enough. I propose 
that current efforts have fallen short of achieving their aims because they were 
constructed for a hypothetical fully rational consumer, rather than one that is 
boundedly rational.  
Chapter 5 presents the results of four surveys and of an analysis of the U.S. 
News Best Hospital rankings for the years 2001-2014. The survey results indicate 
that information presentation matters, and that healthcare quality and price data can 
be confusing to the point where people can draw opposite conclusions from the 
same data. The survey results also indicate that U.S. News Best Hospitals tailors 
information to consumers such that they are more likely to make the right decision. 
Analysis of the U.S. News Best Hospital rankings shows hospitals ranked between 
2008 and 2011 were shown to be significantly more likely to be found in wealthy, 
highly populated areas, while unranked hospitals were more likely to be the sole 
community provider. It also suggests that perceived quality (U.S. News-ranked 
hospitals) is out of alignment with actual quality (hospitals performing above the 
national average for readmission and mortality according to Medicare Hospital 
Compare). 
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From each of these components of analysis emerges a view of price and 
quality transparency as being a potentially useful but complex policy tool, not a silver 
bullet. Having provided an introduction to transparency, I next lay out conditions for 
its success.
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Chapter 2 Theoretical underpinnings of transparency 
 
 
Imagine that you live in Boston and are trying to decide where to have knee 
replacement performed. You are insured and your deductible is $1,000. You pull up 
search results on My Health Care Options, a website run by the Massachusetts 
Health Care Quality and Cost Council. Both hospitals have low rates of surgical site 
infections. Beth Israel Deaconess has treated 275 cases, of which 11% were complex; 
Massachusetts General has treated 624 cases, of which 6% were complex. Beth Israel 
Deaconess Medical Center has a cost that is no different from the median state cost, 
while Massachusetts General Hospital has a cost above the median state cost for this 
procedure. The data provided on the website is from 2008 and 2009, and you are 
making your decision in April 2015. 
In short, you are faced with a large amount of information, all of which is so 
dated that it is likely no longer relevant. It is difficult to infer what the best option 
for your own treatment will be.  
*** 
The behavior of healthcare consumers, providers, and payers determines 
whether price and quality transparency will drive improvements in the value of 
healthcare. The emphasis of this chapter is on finding a theory of the healthcare 
consumer that aligns with reality. Only then can we properly evaluate the potential of 
price and quality transparency initiatives to drive positive change in the U.S. 
healthcare industry through benchmarking, competition, or consumer selection, 
which is the aim of Chapters 3 and 4.  
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In this chapter, I evaluate the view that consumers, providers, and payers are 
capable of making better decisions when presented with full information. I focus 
first on healthcare consumers, then widen my scope to include healthcare providers 
and payers. This connection is possible because just as patients care about their 
health while also having other aims such as financial solvency, the business model of 
healthcare providers depends on providing quality care while also performing 
enough procedures to bring in revenue.  
To determine which model of behavior is most useful here, I expand upon 
the three arguments presented briefly in the introduction: benchmarking, 
competition, and consumer choice. Underlying all three arguments is the economic 
theory that full information is necessary for markets to function efficiently. An 
efficient market allows prices to direct resources toward those who value them most. 
In the context of healthcare, optimal resource allocation would be achieved by 
consumers making informed decisions, choosing the price and quality combination 
that will maximize their own utility.  
The first two arguments describe supply-side change; the third focuses on 
demand. Benchmarking could cause improvements even if we just increase the 
information that providers have about themselves and their competitors, without the 
competitors being identifiable and without the information being made publicly 
available. The second argument differs from the first in that it requires some public 
availability of information in order for competition on price and quality to occur.  
The third argument describes demand-side change. For the third argument to 
hold up, reforms that focus on increasing transparency should be accompanied by 
measures for strengthening citizens’ capacity to act upon the available information 
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(Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010). In the context of the U.S. hospital market, this means 
that factors introducing stickiness, such as in-network providers for those covered by 
insurance, should not be underestimated in their power to limit the impact of 
transparency on bringing about meaningful change.  
To lay the groundwork for evaluating these stances, I present two dominant 
theories of patient behavior, each of which has different implications for 
transparency in healthcare. I evaluate them based on their ability to explain the 
apparent paradox currently observed in the U.S. healthcare market. The paradox is 
that Americans bear the burden of expensive, low-quality care, yet do not actively 
select for cheaper, high-quality care. I argue that, given more active regulator 
promotion of transparency, consumers would be able to make better healthcare 
decisions. 
Through health insurance and the threat of malpractice suits, much of the 
U.S. population does not bear the full brunt of consuming overpriced, low-quality 
healthcare. Despite these protections, 57.1% of all personal bankruptcies in the US 
in 2014 were explicitly tied to medical bills (LaMontagne, 2014). As states resist 
expanding Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act and insurers rely upon market-
based tools such as deductibles, medical bankruptcy will continue to be an issue in 
coming years, even though one aim of ACA was to address its prevalence by 
expanding insurance coverage (Sugden, 2012). Consuming low-quality healthcare 
also brings risks—as of 2000, medical negligence was the third leading cause of death 
in the US, behind heart disease and cancer (Starfield, 2000).  
Despite significant consequences of uninformed consumption of healthcare, 
evidence suggests that healthcare consumers do not spend much time determining 
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the price and the quality of their healthcare options. But for the most part it is not 
because they do not want to—it is because they cannot. In a Kaiser Family 
Foundation phone survey of 1,517 respondents, 64 percent stated that it is difficult 
to find information comparing the cost of different treatments and procedures 
offered by different doctors and hospitals. The survey also shows that between 1996 
and 2008, the percentage of Americans using comparison quality information on 
doctors grew from four percent to a somewhat-less-paltry six percent (KFF, 2008). I 
will address here the implications of a market in which consumers have trouble 
acquiring price information and appear largely uninterested in quality data. My task 
here is not to place value judgments upon any of these facts or behaviors, but rather 
to determine which theory best explains these phenomena.  
2.1 Theory of full economic rationality  
 
Let us start by assuming that consumers act with full economic rationality. A 
consumer can have multiple possible ends—e.g., benefitting society, benefitting 
oneself—and rational choice only specifies the means by which she goes about 
achieving these ends. In the context of price and quality transparency, self-interested 
rationality means that consumers will choose the best value healthcare from a range 
of options, given all available information. (The competing theory, presented in the next 
section, differs on this last point of “all available information.”) 
The theory of self-interested rationality in healthcare consumption aligns 
with intuitions about human motivation. Freedom from injury and severe illness is a 
good on which most people place a high value. Transparency ties a patient-centric 
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approach to the market, ostensibly granting consumers agency in their healthcare 
decisions. 
When policies are based on the assumption of full rationality, they can take 
the form of forcing consumers to bear a large portion of the burden when things go 
wrong. The rationale is that, if people care about themselves first and foremost, they 
will make better decisions if they face the consequences of whatever they decide. 
According to this line of reasoning, a price transparency initiative built on this 
approach might, for instance, show consumers that several preventative care 
measures (e.g., regular check-ups, using an inhaler) add up to be much less costly in 
the long run than a hospital visit resulting from lax preventative behavior. In that 
way, such an initiative could incentivize consumers to behave in a way that is better 
for their health and for their wallets.  
But with full economic rationality, the consumer can also exercise the 
capacity to make decisions based on the bigger picture, weighing costs and benefits 
as they will have an impact not just on the consumer, but also on her family, friends, 
and the rest of the world, insofar as they are part of her utility function. We can 
imagine a system where the state takes the role of social planner, by imposing 
penalties and rewards for self-destructive behavior. Yet, once we realize that people 
take other interests besides their own into account, we are able to pass along some of 
the “social planner” capacity to the individual agents. The role of policy, then, is to 
provide information in the format best suited to enabling consumers to weigh their 
decisions. For example, price transparency could be designed to show an eighty-year-
old man the cost of his third bypass surgery, and allow him to see the number of 
prenatal visits for low-income mothers the same amount of money could have 
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funded. Such information could lead him to change his behavior, or it might not, but 
either way he would be more informed. 
Full economic rationality allows for people to refrain from expensive 
treatment to ease the burden on their families, or to prefer suboptimal health to 
being a financial burden on relatives or friends. But full economic rationality does 
not necessarily entail sacrificing one’s health. It just calls for a weighing of the 
options, and could lead to refraining from expensive treatment in order to leave 
funds untouched for one’s child to go to college. Alternately, it could lead to 
investing in the expensive treatment in the hopes that the child will have a better 
childhood with a living father.  
2.2 Limitations of full economic rationality  
Everyone has values and preferences that inform the decisions they make. 
Assuming full economic rationality, an agent will place appropriate value on her 
health, depending on her preferences. The value a healthcare consumer places on his 
own health determines how much time he will invest in gathering information about 
his options. To place near-infinite value on said freedom leads a terminal patient to 
spend resources on hopeless treatments because the treatments have some chance—
however slim—of benefiting him. In contrast, an agent with different priorities 
might identify that the same resources might bring about more benefit overall if 
saved for one’s heirs, or used for palliative care (which might indeed actually be in 
one’s self-interest, depending on one’s preferences). If a person places an infinite 
value on her freedom from injury, the best thing she can do is pursue as much 
available information as possible. But, if she has additional aims besides freedom 
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from injury, then she will stop seeking information at the point at which accurate 
information is unavailable.  
Rational choice theory assumes complete, transitive preferences, defined over 
known, fixed outcomes, with decision makers maximizing their utility by choosing 
the option that yields the highest level of benefits, discounted by costs (Jones, 1999). 
But to meet all of these conditions, especially that of known and fixed outcomes, 
does not seem quite plausible in the context of healthcare. The subjective expected-
utility variant of rational choice theory associates a probability distribution, estimated 
by the decision-maker, with outcomes, thereby integrating risk and uncertainty 
(Jones, 1999). The subjective expected-utility variant accounts for the uncertainty 
inherent to healthcare and allows for people to opt for choices benefitting others in 
addition to or instead of themselves. However, it still does not explain a person who 
must make a rushed decision about whether to have an emergency procedure, and 
does not have time to calculate risks. It is difficult to calculate probabilities perfectly 
in most of these cases, but price and quality transparency can fill in some areas of 
uncertainty. 
2.3 Theory of bounded rationality  
 
Let us now turn to the second theory, which is a revision of the first. The 
second theory holds that patients act with bounded rationality. Bounded rationality is 
the same as full economic rationality, but with stipulations about process to explain 
why people sometimes make decisions with sub-optimal outcomes. These 
assumptions about process are that the rationality of individuals is limited by three 
factors: (1) the information they have, (2) the cognitive limitations of their minds, 
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and (3) the finite time they have to make a decision (Jones, 1999). Price and quality 
transparency have the potential to mitigate the first and third factors: by providing 
relevant information for different circumstances, such as the average cost and 
mortality for heart attack patients at a certain hospital, transparency can enable a 
quick, well-informed decision.  
Figure 1: Bounded rationality and full rationality (conceptual diagram) 
 
As Figure 1 shows, bounded rationality can lead to a suboptimal decision. In 
contrast, full rationality avoids the limitations of imperfect information, time and 
cost constraints, and cognitive limitations, leading to a better decision. Yet, a theory 
of bounded rationality is useful in the context of healthcare because it accommodates 
the limited information available in healthcare and the implausibility of patients being 
able to devote the entirety of their mental energy to these decisions. If patients 
behave according to bounded rationality, then we ought to construct transparency 
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policies very differently than if we were to posit fully economic rationality. 
Specifically, an assumption of bounded rationality may lead us to discount the 
expected benefits of price and quality transparency initiatives. 
Let us consider a patient who is choosing between multiple cancer 
treatments. She may categorize them as high, medium, and low risk, then make a 
decision based on how much risk she willing to accept. The danger with this 
technique is that it may be more useful to categorize cancer treatment options based 
on efficacy, and she is making a sub-optimal decision in terms of utility maximization 
by choosing based on risk instead. Properly presented quality information could 
guide her toward the optimal decision. 
Now let us say that she is simply unable choose whether to have chemo or 
surgery—let us say these are the only treatment options available—and so she does 
nothing. In the meantime, the cancer metastasizes. The problem with this, from a 
policymaker’s perspective, is that the making of a decision—any decision—would 
have been better. Cognitive overload and processing constraints can lead to 
consumers deferring choice, even if the status quo is less desirable than any of the 
options (Schlesinger, 2010). Adjusting the parameters of decisions can encourage 
optimal outcomes by making the right choice easy.  
Finally, patients may make choices by selectively evaluating events and 
circumstances to improve perceived self-efficacy (Schlesinger, 2010). Patients may 
make sub-optimal decisions (like self-operation) if they use certain emotional 
heuristics and filters. It would be better to eliminate the need for heuristics in this 
context, to enable optimal outcomes. 
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2.4 Implications of bounded rationality  
 
The previous sections have proposed that price and quality transparency 
policies would be most effective if based on the assumption of bounded rationality. I 
now show how this could play out for healthcare consumers, providers, and payers. 
2.4.1 For healthcare consumers 
 
Viewing patient choice through the lens of bounded rationality can help us 
create better policies than understanding patient choice through full economic 
rationality. But what do considerations about bounded rationality mean in practice? 
First, to reduce the risk of patients categorizing choices in ways that highlight the 
wrong elements of options, policymakers can take the extra step to reduce the 
cognitive burden of choice by categorizing choices based on the most important 
characteristics. They could consult with experts to determine the most important 
characteristics. The question remains of who would be best positioned to do this. 
Doctors seem to be the clear choice, given variation among cases, but they might 
lack the time to present choices like this.  
A second implication of bounded rationality in crafting transparency policy is 
that, to minimize the danger of patients making sub-optimal decisions through use of 
emotional heuristics and filters, policymakers can reduce the need for emotional 
heuristics and filters by instilling trust in the system through transparency about price 
and quality. For instance, if a healthcare consumer is tempted to self-operate because 
she does not trust the medical professional’s expertise, she could then read the 
statistics on the physician’s quality, and on the risks and potential complications of 
the recommended procedure.  
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Finally, to avoid cognitive overload and processing constraints, policymakers 
can tailor information to individuals’ specific concerns. An exemplary instance of 
information tailoring is the healthcare cost comparison website for Maine, which 
provides a reasonable amount of relevant information based on the needs of 
individual consumers. The website assesses consumer needs through the inputting of 
search terms. For instance, if I tell the website that I am a new patient with low to 
moderate problems who wants to know how much an office visit will cost, the 
website will provide me with the statewide average cost and then the cost for each 
hospital in the state.  
In contrast, an example of an ineffective approach would be a spreadsheet 
with all the information behind the scenes for the website. This approach could be 
based on an assumption of full economic rationality, with a consumer presumed to 
be able to consume whatever amount of information is appropriate to make a 
decision. It could also be based on an assumption of self-interest, with patients 
placing near-infinite value on their own freedom from severe injury and illness and 
thereby consuming as much information as possible. Given bounded rationality, we 
understand that providing consumers with the right amount of relevant information 
enables them to process it, given their available time and mental energy. To do so 
perfectly would, in an ideal world, involve making the raw data available for 
economists and researchers who want it all, in addition to the consumer-friendly 
versions. 
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2.4.2 For healthcare providers 
 
When considering how price and quality transparency will play out, we must 
consider the potential responses of all market players. In this section, I present the 
implications of boundedly rational healthcare providers. 
In its current form, the system allows for some degree of gaming. For 
instance, it is in the interest of hospitals to devote resources to getting out the vote 
whenever rankings season comes around. Two emails sent to all staff and faculty in 
the Mount Sinai Health System indicate that the administration is consistently 
involved in getting out the vote for U.S. News Best Hospitals survey responses (see 
Appendix for full emails). Indicative quotes are: 
We appreciate your assistance in ensuring that the Mount Sinai 
Health System is fully represented in the nomination process. (Davis 
and Charney, 2014) 
 
Thank you for your continued commitment to advancing both the 
outstanding patient care of the Mount Sinai Health System, and the 
innovative education provided by the Icahn School of Medicine at 
Mount Sinai. (Davis and Charney, 2015) 
 
If the U.S. healthcare market had full information, those resources could be devoted 
to more useful ends, such as patient care. Furthermore, some hospital systems have 
more resources to devote to getting out the vote than others. 
 The complexity of the U.S. healthcare market also means that for some 
providers, it is optimal for them to remove themselves from the system. For 
instance, Dr. Michael Ciampi, a primary care physician based in Maine, converted his 
practice to a no-insurance model in April 2013 (Woodruff, 2013). His argument? “I 
work for patients. I don’t work for the government and I don’t work for insurance 
companies.” Since the switch, he has lowered his prices due to savings on overhead, 
but has also lost hundreds of his initial 2,000 patients (Woodruff, 2013). Bounded 
 21 
 
rationality accounts for this outcome by attributing Dr. Ciampi’s decision to his 
limited energies and time. Furthermore, Dr. Ciampi is not alone, although psychiatry 
remains the number one specialty where doctors do not participate in health 
insurance plans. For those opting out, not participating in insurance means that they 
(1) can charge more, (2) do not have to spend time on the paperwork for insurance, 
and (3) have the freedom to provide better care by spending more time with patients 
(Miller, 2014; Sullivan, 2012). Groups have developed around this, such as the 
American Academy of Private Physicians (Physicians, 2015), and the number of 
doctors practicing private medicine has passed 5,000 (Wieczner, 2013). 
 
2.4.3 For healthcare payers 
 
We need to be wary of overregulating the private sector. A 2012 survey sent 
to 630,000 physicians (84 percent of all physicians in active patient care) with 13,575 
respondents revealed that physicians spend over 22 percent of their time on non-
clinical paperwork; that over 52 percent of physicians have limited the access 
Medicare patients have to their practices or are planning to do so; that over 26 
percent of physicians have closed their practices to Medicaid patients; and that 7 
percent plan to switch to cash-only or concierge practices (Hawkins, 2012).  
While these findings speak more immediately to the private practice 
community than to hospitals, they have serious implications for healthcare payers. If 
insurers are being cut out because providers are sick of jumping through hoops to 
work with them, then it is in the interest of boundedly rational healthcare payers to 
resist transparency efforts. 
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2.5 Chapter conclusion 
 
The success or failure of price and quality transparency hinges upon the 
extent to which policies take into account the boundedly rational behavior of 
healthcare consumers, providers, and payers. My argument rests upon a normative 
claim that policies are preferable if they result in consumers making optimal 
decisions. If bounded rational choice theory describes patient behavior, then the 
main concern of the healthcare system should be whether healthcare consumers are 
provided the appropriate amount of relevant information. Likewise, if bounded 
rationality accurately describes provider and payer behavior, then transparency 
policies should be designed to place a minimal burden on providers and payers while 
incentivizing price and quality improvements.  
Having laid out the theoretical basis for transparency and presented a model 
the behavior of healthcare market participants, the rest of this paper seeks to 
demonstrate that bounded rationality indeed fits empirically with the ways in which 
price and quality transparency currently functions in the U.S. 
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Chapter 3 Implementing price transparency  
 
Most people aren’t interested in irrelevant hospital charge-masters, or the 
details of health plan negotiations. They simply want to know what they’ll 
be paying themselves at the end of the day.  
(Statement of Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, Ranking Member, Finance, 2013) 
 
Hospital charges can be staggering. Daniel Diaz was billed $3,355.96 for five stitches 
on his finger after cutting himself while peeling an avocado; a dab of skin glue on Orla 
Duffy’s forehead laceration ran up a $1,696 bill (Rosenthal, 2013). This disproportionality 
can also be seen with medications: at California Pacific Medical Center, a Tylenol with 
codeine pill (market price: $0.50) costs $36.78 (Rosenthal, 2013). One cannot help but 
wonder—why not just send your friend over to Wal-Mart or CVS to pick up some Tylenol 
instead?  
Indeed, Wal-Mart entered the primary care market on April 18, 2014 with a medical 
clinic in Copperas Cove, Texas (Canales, 2014). It brought to the table a clear value 
proposition: come to us for a $40 appointment, and that $40 will buy you wellness and 
preventative care, primary acute care, and referrals to specialists (Wal-Mart, 2015). (For those 
covered by Wal-Mart’s employee health plan, that visit will cost only $4 (Flessner, 2014).) 
Prior to going in for a lab test or immunization, you can look up the price online–$3 for a 
blood sugar test, 25 for a flu vaccine (Wal-Mart, 2015).  
These examples highlight the disjunction between what makes sense to consumers 
and what the healthcare industry is currently doing. They speak to the complex interaction of 
the public and private sectors in the U.S. healthcare market, which this chapter addresses in 
the context of price transparency. 
*** 
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Building on the foundation laid in Chapter 2, let us now evaluate price transparency 
initiatives. This chapter examines barriers to transparency and uses lessons from case studies 
to develop an understanding of price and quality transparency policy. It shows that, of seven 
federal price transparency bills sponsored between 2007 and 2013, 61 percent of sponsors 
were Republicans.5 Yet, of 174 pieces of price transparency legislation passed in 45 states 
between 1956 and 2013, 60.47 percent passed when state legislatures were a majority 
Democrats (t = 2.827; p = 0.005) (sources of information: Delbanco, 2014; NCSL, 2015a; 
analysis mine). This chapter also puts forth criteria for the selection and evaluation of 
exemplary price transparency initiatives, such as evaluating the user-friendliness of a state’s 
website by determining whether it allows the user to compare specific hospitals. 
3.1 Existing work on price transparency 
 
To discuss price transparency, it is necessary to first define key concepts relating to 
price information in the context of healthcare. (See Appendix for examples.) First, the 
chargemaster is a list of a hospital’s prices for every procedure performed in the hospital and 
every supply item used during those procedures (Reinhardt, 2006). These procedures 
correspond roughly to the groupings of Medicare Severity Diagnosis Related Groups (MS-DRGs), 
which are a Medicare coding for their payment system. MS-DRGs classify each hospital case 
into one of 999 groups that is published in the Federal Register (CMS, 2013a; "Code of 
Colorado Regulations: Annual health reporting and data retention requirements," 2010). Any 
given MS-DRG is tied to a reimbursement rate. The reimbursement rate is the amount, by MS-
DRG code, that a carrier paid for a procedure at a facility or hospital, plus any expected 
                                            
5 These seven bills—H.R. 2853 (2013), H.R. 1326 (2013), H.R. 5800 (2012), H.R. 4803 (2010), H.R. 2249 
(2009), H.R. 2566 (2009), and S. 2221 (2007)—were found through using the terms “price,” “transparency,” 
and “healthcare” to search ProQuest Congressional Publications. To increase the timeliness of the findings, the 
search results were limited to the year 2007 onward. 
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deductible, copayment, or coinsurance ("Code of Colorado Regulations: Annual health 
reporting and data retention requirements," 2010).  
Each of these concepts has different implications for consumer decision-making. 
For example, reimbursement rates often differ significantly from hospital charges. A 
consumer covered by health insurance may not care about either, and be only interested in 
his or her co-pay. For a consumer who is not covered by health insurance or who is in a 
high-deductible plan, he or she may be responsible for the full chargemaster rate. However, 
depending on state and hospital policies, the patient may receive the care for free, or may 
only need to pay an amount close to the actual reimbursement rate being paid by insurance 
companies, Medicare, and Medicaid.  
It seems clear that the more specific information is, the more useful it is to the 
patient—within reason. For example, it is more useful for a consumer to have quality 
information tied directly to a given illness or procedure at a hospital (i.e., DRG or 
chargemaster category) than to have overall hospital quality information. But it may be 
overwhelming for him to be provided with twenty-five indicators of a hospital’s quality for 
cardiac bypass surgery, rather than the five most important measures.  
Furthermore, one must determine whether the information presented will drive 
improvements, either through benchmarking, competition, or consumer choice. I now turn 
to the empirical literature on the consequences of price transparency for healthcare provider 
performance, which is still relatively limited, in part because price transparency efforts are 
relatively new (Sinaiko & Rosenthal, 2011).  
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3.1.1 Limited effects of price transparency on price variation 
 
New Hampshire provides a test case of price transparency failing to contain costs. In 
2007, New Hampshire launched HealthCost, a website listing prices for medical procedures. 
The New Hampshire Insurance Department (NHID) conducted a study in June 2009 on 
price variation for medical procedures. The NHID analyzed claims data for HealthCost 
procedures, using timeframes before and after the website’s release (NHID, 2009). The 
study broke down HealthCost procedures into average allowed amount paid, the coefficient 
of variation, the median allowed amount, and the percent increase for each year analyzed 
(NHID, 2009). It demonstrated that there had been no change in price variation as a result 
of greater transparency (NHID, 2009). Instead, prices increased within similar ranges as in 
prior years (NHID, 2009). The NHID did not perform significance testing because price 
variation clearly did not decrease during the relevant time period (NHID, 2009). Overall, the 
study showed that price transparency failed to contain costs in New Hampshire from 2007 
to 2009. 
But looking over a longer time frame did not improve the findings from New 
Hampshire. A follow-up 2014 report on New Hampshire’s HealthCost program was based 
on interviews with healthcare stakeholders and experts, focusing on the steps taken in New 
Hampshire and how they have affected healthcare markets across the state (Tu & 
Gourevitch, 2014). Its focus was qualitative, highlighting developments such as hospital-
sponsored price transparency, hospital renegotiation of lower contract rates, and price-
shopping tools with incentives (Tu & Gourevitch, 2014). Although it did not measure price 
variation, it did claim that consumer usage had remained steady.  
Yet, evidence from New Hampshire does not mean that price transparency could 
not contain costs in another context. Building on the NHID’s 2009 study, Tu and Lauer 
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(2009) noted two potential reasons for the lack of impact: (1) weak provider competition due 
to geographical segmentation and few competitors, and (2) only five percent of privately 
insured state residents being enrolled in high-deductible plans in 2007 (Tu & Lauer, 2009). 
The first reason would reduce consumer ability to shop around, while the second reason 
would limit the incentives to do so.  
3.1.2 Consumers shopping around for medication 
 
There is evidence that consumers comparison-shop when able. Hsu et al.’s 2008 
study on Medicare beneficiaries’ responses to drug costs provides evidence that consumers 
shop around for prescription drugs when they bear significant costs of their care (Hsu, Fung, 
Price, & al., 2008). The study provides little insight into healthcare providers, but does speak 
to the larger question of how patients use price information in making healthcare decisions. 
Hsu et al. (2008) conducted 1,040 telephone interviews in a stratified random sample of 
community-dwelling Kaiser Permanente-Northern California Medicare Advantage 
beneficiaries aged 65 or older (Hsu et al., 2008). They measured cost-related responses in 
terms of cost-coping behaviors such as switching to lower-cost medications, reduced 
adherence such as not refilling prescriptions, and financial burden, as manifested in going 
without necessities (Hsu et al., 2008). 36 percent of respondents reported at least one of 
these cost-related responses to drug costs (Hsu et al., 2008). Multivariate analyses showed 
that beneficiaries with lower household income more frequently reported cost responses, 
with a difference of 14.5 percentage points for those making less than $40,000 per year 
compared to those making $40,000 or more per year (Hsu et al., 2008). In light of this 
information on consumer response, price transparency seems as though it could facilitate 
demand-side change in the healthcare industry.  
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3.1.3 Consumers shopping around for providers 
 
The previous study showed that people shop around for medication—but do these 
findings hold up in the context of provider selection? A 2014 retrospective cross-sectional 
study of an insurer-initiated price transparency program sought to encourage patients to 
select high-value providers (Wu, Sylwestrzak, Shah, & DeVries, 2014). The study used 
administrative claims data from commercial Blue Cross and Blue Shield health plans in the 
Northeast, Midwest, and Southeast regions of the United States. The intervention cohort 
resided in the metropolitan hospital service areas of Atlanta, GA; Cincinnati, OH; Cleveland, 
OH; Indianapolis, IN; and St. Louis, MO. The reference cohort resided in areas in the same 
census regions as the intervention group, but in different metropolitan hospital service areas. 
Patients had at least one outpatient diagnostic MRI scan during either the pre-
implementation (2010) or post-implementation (2012) year. There were 61,271 patients in 
the intervention cohort and 44,366 patients in the reference cohort, for a total of 105,637 
patients who had at least one MRI scan. Age and sex distributions were comparable in the 
two groups (Wu et al., 2014).  
In the intervention group, patients were informed of price differences among 
available MRI facilities and offered the possibility of selecting different providers (Wu et al., 
2014). The intervention group realized a $220 cost reduction per test (18.7 percent), 
decreased use of hospital-based facilities (from 53 percent in 2010 to 45 percent in 2012), 
and reduced price variation between hospital and nonhospital facilities for the intervention 
group by 30 percent (Wu et al., 2014). The reduced price variation speaks to a market 
response to the greater information available, one that allows patients to shift to a more 
efficient allocation. 
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3.2 Barriers to price transparency 
 
The complexity of price transparency is partly due to the large number of 
stakeholders. Stakeholders generally in favor of price transparency include consumer 
advocacy lobbies, and some physicians. For example, consumer advocacy lobbies, such as 
Health Access California,6 call for more consumer power in making healthcare choices, and 
were behind California’s 2003 passing of price transparency legislation (Berger, 2013). 
Meanwhile, the Alliance for Academic Internal Medicine (AAIM) and the American College 
of Physicians (ACP) promote high-value, cost-conscious care principles (Smith, 2012), while 
other supporters include the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF),7 the AARP,8 the 
Alliance for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety (AQIPS),9 and The Alliance.10  
More hesitant in its support of price transparency is the Federation of American 
Hospitals, which represents more than 1,000 investor-owned or managed community 
hospitals and health systems throughout the United States (Finance, 2013). In its statement 
                                            
6 Health Access California is the statewide coalition for California healthcare consumers (California, 2015). It 
was founded in 1987 and advocates for quality, affordable healthcare for all Californians (California, 2015). 
Recent efforts include county-based initiatives such as the Low-Income Health Programs, the country’s largest 
early expansion of Medicaid under the ACA (California, 2015). 
7 Risa Lavizzo-Mourey, president and CEO of RWJF, was quoted in 2013 as saying, in praise of the new federal 
publication of chargemaster data for the most common Medicare procedures: “Transformation of the 
healthcare delivery system cannot occur without greater price transparency. While more work lies ahead, the 
release of these hospital price data will allow us to shine a light on the often vast variations in hospital charges” 
(HHS, 2013). 
8 In a 2013 comment submitted on a CMS proposal to publicize physician-specific reimbursement rates, the 
AARP wrote: “Full transparency through public release of all relevant data, including physician data, is essential 
for a vibrant, effective, and competitive marketplace in Medicare. Thus, the program itself, the people it serves, 
and the public at-large, have a vested interest in understanding how Medicare dollars are used by physicians and 
other healthcare providers” (AARP et al., 2013). 
9 Also in a 2013 comment submitted on a CMS proposal to publicize physician-specific reimbursement rates, 
AQIPS wrote: “Releasing Medicare claims data to the public will fuel a tremendous amount of learning about 
and improvement of the quality and cost of healthcare. The real value of public Medicare data will be realized 
through the innovation that it catalyzes” (AARP et al., 2013). 
10 The Alliance is a non-for-profit cooperative owned by employers that provide self-funded health benefits to 
more than 80,000 employees and their family members across three states, and wrote in a 2013 comment 
submitted on a CMS proposal to publicize physician-specific reimbursement rates: “When patients seek care, 
they generally do so at the individual physician level as opposed to the hospital level, and they deserve 
information on the quality of care provided by individual physicians” (AARP et al., 2013). 
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for the record before the Senate Committee on Finance on June 18, 2013, the Federation of 
American Hospitals prefaces its contributions by stating that it “supports efforts to promote 
transparency and provide quality and price information that enhances consumer choice.” It 
proceeds to condemn the recent release of hospital charge data from Medicare inpatient and 
outpatient procedures, writing, “CMS MISSES THE MARK BY PROVIDING 
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS” (formatting and capitalization 
in original) (Finance, 2013). It argues that: 
Unfortunately, the CMS charge data release is more likely to confuse consumers than 
provide meaningful, useful information, and even worse, it could mislead consumers into 
making a wrong choice that could actually harm them. This is because the charges posted by 
CMS are not prices in the conventional sense that consumers think of them—that is, the 
actual price patients are expected to pay for their care. (Finance, 2013) 
 
It bears repeating that a significant challenge for price transparency is the drastic 
difference between chargemaster rates and prices paid. Chargemaster rates are easy to 
provide and not very useful to consumers; prices paid information is difficult to provide but 
much more useful to consumers. In its 2013 statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Finance, the American Hospital Association (AHA) highlights the challenge of providing 
meaningful information to consumers: 
Hospital care is specifically tailored to the needs of each individual patient. For example, a 
gallbladder operation for one patient may be relatively simple, but for another patient, it 
could be fraught with unforeseen complications, making meaningful “up front” pricing 
difficult and, perhaps, confusing for patients...It is also important to note that, for most 
patients, what is most important and relevant is how much they will be required to pay out-
of-pocket. Because insurers determine how high their customers’ out-of-pocket rates will be, 
patients need insurers to provide real-time information. (Finance, 2013) 
 
Branching off from the consumer-centric concerns raised by the Federation of 
American Hospitals and the American Hospital Association, other stakeholders generally 
opposed to transparency include managed care organizations, the hospital industry, insurers, 
and pharmaceutical companies.  For example, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers 
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of America (PhRMA), which represents the leading research-based pharmaceutical 
companies in the U.S., advocated against a price transparency bill that was rejected in 
Congress in 2010, because “overly broad proposals” could raise prices across the board due 
to too much transparency (Berger, 2013). The American Academy of Dermatology 
Association (AADA) and the American Association of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons 
(AAOMS) also tend to oppose price transparency, arguing that it may “degrade the 
physician-patient relationship” 11 and “publicly vilify” dermatologists.12 
Now that we have encountered the main viewpoints on price transparency, let us 
turn our attentions to politics. Political barriers to price transparency stem from the fact that 
it is difficult to precisely pinpoint price transparency’s location in the ideological spectrum. 
On the one hand, it fosters market participation; on the other, it requires government 
intervention. We then see price and quality transparency being championed by Republicans 
and Democrats alike,13 with support and opposition from both parties.14,15 Paul Ginsburg 
                                            
11 In a 2013 comment submitted on a CMS proposal to publicize physician-specific reimbursement rates, the 
American Association of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons raised concerns including “the AAOMS believes that 
there is a risk with disclosing physician payment information as it may degrade the physician-patient 
relationship when there is no cause nor benefit for doing so” (AARP et al., 2013). 
12 In a 2013 comment submitted on a CMS proposal to publicize physician-specific reimbursement rates, the 
American Academy of Dermatology Association raised concerns including “Publicly vilifying [dermatologists in 
some areas] is not only inaccurate and unfair, but may result in their termination of these paraprofessionals, 
with a resulting decrease in access to care for Medicare beneficiaries, in order to normalize their practice 
profiles” (AARP et al., 2013). 
13 On October 17, 2006, Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue, a Republican, signed an executive order creating the 
Health Information Technology and Transparency Advisory Board (Seals, 2006). “Transparency in the 
healthcare marketplace is essential,” he said. “Increased transparency in Georgia’s healthcare industry will help 
families make informed decisions based on the costs and the quality of the services they receive” (Seals, 2006). 
Governor Perdue’s executive order followed mere months after President Bush’s Executive Order on August 
22, 2006 was signed, to “Help Increase the Transparency of America’s Healthcare System—Empowering 
Americans to Find Better Value and Better Care” (Seals, 2006). In 2009, Representative Steve Kagan (D-Wisc.) 
proposed the Transparency in All Health Care Pricing Act (H.R. 4700). “There is no reason patients should be 
prevented from knowing the price of a pill before they buy it—and knowing what the person in line in front of 
them is paying for the same prescription,” he argued during hearings in the E&C Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Health on May 6. (Barlas, 2010) 
14 For example, the Health Care Price Transparency Promotion Act of 2012 (which died in the House of 
Representatives) was sponsored by Michael Burgess (R-TX). The bill’s three co-sponsors were John Carter (R-
TX), Gene Green (D-TX), and Mac Thornberry (R-TX) (Impulse, 2014).  
15 In 2012, Arizona attempted to pass price transparency legislation, but it was killed by a large majority of both 
Democrats and Republicans because of massive pushback from industry representatives, with 50 in attendance 
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notes in his 2013 statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance that the goal of 
healthcare price transparency is “lowering prices by engaging consumers to choose providers 
on the basis of value” (Finance, 2013). Given the marked increase in the frequency of 
legislative deadlock over the past decade (Binder, 2014), the level of agreement on the 
desirability of transparency in healthcare is remarkable.  
 
Figure 2: All-payer claims databases (APCDs) and price transparency, 2014-2015 
(map) 
 
(Source of information for map: A. Council, 2015b; Delbanco, 2014) 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the extent to which APCDs coincide with price transparency 
legislation—34 states had some combination of existing transparency legislation and an 
APCD in existence, in the process of implementation, with strong interest, or existing 
                                                                                                                                  
at the bill’s final stakeholder meeting to argue against it (Berger, 2013). The bill was sponsored by a Republican, 
Nancy Barto, who argued that the resistance was so strong because hospitals and device manufacturers benefit 
from keeping their prices secret and high (Berger, 2013).  
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voluntarily. Twelve states developed all-payer claims databases, and six states were in the 
process of implementing APCDs as of 2015 (A. Council, 2015b). 
Given the growing presence of price transparency initiatives, let us attempt to 
pinpoint price transparency’s location in the political spectrum. As depicted in Figure 3, 
analysis of seven price transparency bills on the federal level from 2007 to 2013 showed that 
61 percent of sponsors were Republicans.16 With a small sample size of 31 sponsors, that 
percentage was statistically significant at a 90 percent confidence interval (t = 1.9837; p = 
0.0565).  
Figure 3: Federal legislation for price transparency: Partisan sponsorship of House 
and Senate bills (chart) 
 
(Sources for information in chart: Delbanco, 2014; Impulse, 2015) 
 
Yet, as Figure 4 shows, the pattern of Republicans pushing for price transparency 
does not hold up on the state level. Of 174 pieces of price transparency legislation passed in 
                                            
16 These seven bills—H.R. 2853 (2013), H.R. 1326 (2013), H.R. 5800 (2012), H.R. 4803 (2010), H.R. 2249 
(2009), H.R. 2566 (2009), and S. 2221 (2007)—were found through using the terms “price,” “transparency,” 
and “healthcare” to search ProQuest Congressional Publications. To increase the timeliness of the findings, the 
search results were limited to the year 2007 onward. 
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45 states between 1956 and 2013, 60.47 percent passed when state legislatures were a 
majority Democrats (t = 2.827; p = 0.005), and 60.51 percent passed when the state 
governor was a Democrat (t = 2.837; p = 0.005) (sources of information: Delbanco, 2014; 
NCSL, 2015a; analysis mine).  
 
Figure 4: State legislation for price transparency: Partisan control of state legislature 
and party affiliation of governor when legislation passed (chart) 
 
(Sources of information: Delbanco, 2014; NCSL, 2015a; analysis mine) 
 
However, it bears mentioning that laws vary widely between states, and that not all 
price transparency legislation is created equal. Inconsistencies in legislation are tied to party 
differences: of the five states that received passing grades for their price transparency laws in 
2014 when evaluated by Catalyst for Payment Reform (Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Vermont, and Virginia), four had Democratic governors in 2013 and one had a Republican 
governor (Delbanco, 2014). Inconsistencies in implementation can be seen in how some 
states have enacted price transparency measures: some have state-mandated websites, and 
some have voluntary websites (NCSL, 2015b) (WSJ, 2014) (Delbanco, 2014). Variation 
60%
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between states is useful for this thesis because it makes it easier to tell, through trial and 
error, what works and what does not. 
 
Figure 5: Price transparency and political parties in control of state legislation in 2014 
(map) 
 
(Source of information for map: A. Council, 2015b; Delbanco, 2014; NCSL, 2014) 
 
Meanwhile, the debate about price transparency is closely observed and participated 
in by major stakeholders, for whom different outcomes would be ideal. These stakeholders 
include the government, healthcare providers, and healthcare payers. For some, the current 
opaqueness of healthcare, with little data on price and quality, is beneficial. For others, it is 
highly problematic. The government has a consumer protection role, with a simultaneous 
interest in budgetary sustainability because it is also the payer for Medicare.17 Healthcare 
                                            
17 As an example of the consumer protection function of the government, then-Secretary of HHS Sebelius was 
quoted in 2013 as saying, in support of the HHS initiative to make chargemaster data public: “Currently, 
consumers don’t know what a hospital is charging them or their insurance company for a given procedure, like 
a knee replacement, or how much of a price difference there is at different hospitals, even within the same city. 
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providers have an interest in keeping their business practices private, although many have 
been forced to release chargemaster data, through the state of California’s Payer’s Bill of 
Rights, enacted in 2005 (Development, 2012). Healthcare payers, primarily insurance 
companies, negotiate rates separately with each hospital, competing with each other to get 
more favorable terms. Their goal is to keep their business practices and terms of agreement 
private to the extent that doing so will protect their businesses. 
3.3 Federal initiatives for price transparency 
 
One federal source of price information is the Hospital Provider Charge and Actual 
Payment Data, released in August 2013 by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS). It compares the charges for the 100 most common inpatient services and 30 
common outpatient services across the nation.  It includes the "list prices" on initial 
submitted bills, as well as the actual amounts paid by Medicare nationwide, covering 3,300 
hospitals, with more than 170,000 listed price data points.  This data set only shows what 
Medicare pays, not what private payers negotiate with providers, nor what consumers would 
pay out of pocket. 
Public reception to the federal government releasing payment information varies. On 
August 6, 2013, CMS issued a Request for Public Comments on the Potential Release of 
Medicare Physician Data, seeking input on whether to make individual physician payment 
information publicly available and, if so, in what form (CMS, 2013b). CMS opened the 
proposed policy to public comment following a 2013 Florida federal district court decision 
to lift an injunction on the disclosure of individual physician reimbursement information 
                                                                                                                                  
This data and new data centers will help fill that gap” (HHS, 2013). Relating more closely to the government’s 
concern with budgetary sustainability, a 2013 request for public comment included the statement: “CMS 
recognizes the role data can play in achieving the common goal of better quality healthcare at lower costs” 
(CMS, 2013c). 
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that had been in place since 1979 (CMS, 2013b, 2013c). During the comment period, from 
August 6, 2013 through September 6, 2013, CMS received more than 130 comments, 
representing the views of over 300 organizations and individuals (CMS, 2013b). Starting in 
February 2014, the first quality measures were added to Physician Compare, a website 
created by the Affordable Care Act that involves groups reporting quality data through the 
Physician Quality Reporting System (CMS, 2015a). 
Another federal initiative attempts to foster state-run price transparency: in 2013, 
HHS made $87 million available to states, to be used for their rate review programs and to 
further healthcare pricing transparency (HHS, 2013). The simultaneous funding of data 
centers to collect, analyze, and publish healthcare pricing and medical claims reimbursement 
data was intended to make these data useful to consumers (HHS, 2013). 
3.4 State initiatives for price transparency 
  
State approaches to price transparency differ in terms of the measures of price, the 
modes of presentation, and the content presented. In this section, I present examples of 
states that have done price transparency well. I argue that their successful elements are built 
on an assumption of boundedly rational consumers. For example, when the information is 
only on the aggregate level, it can be useful for policymakers. However, it will not be very 
useful for the average consumer’s budgeting purposes to know that surgeries at a given 
hospital usually cost about $40,000.  
Example states were selected through a multi-step process. The first step was 
determining which states received passing grades on the 2014 Report Card on State Price 
Transparency Laws. The Report Card was released in 2013 and again in 2014 by two 
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nonprofit organizations: Catalyst for Payment Reform18 and Health Care Incentives 
Improvement Institute19 (Delbanco, 2014). The Report Card seeks “to examine consumers’ 
access to price information in all 50 states, using well-defined grading criteria applied to laws, 
regulations, and state-mandated websites” (Delbanco, 2014). The grading criteria can be 
viewed in the report, which awards points based on attributes such as scope, ease of use, 
utility, and accuracy for websites. States receiving “passing” grades on the 2014 Report Card 
on State Price Transparency Laws are Colorado (receiving a C), Maine (B), Massachusetts 
(B), Vermont (C), and Virginia (C). The remaining 45 states failed.  
The second step was to cross-reference the list of passing-grade states with 
information from the All-Payer Claims Database Council. An all-payer claims database 
(henceforth “APCD”) is a large-scale database that systematically collects medical claims, 
pharmacy claims, dental claims, and eligibility and provider files from private and public 
payers, with the first statewide APCD system established in Maine in 2003 (A. Council, 
January 2014). An APCD differs from a chargemaster significantly in that an APCD 
provides information on prices actually paid for care, whereas a chargemaster only includes 
prices that form the starting point for negotiation. The APCD Council serves in an 
information-sharing capacity for states with all-payer healthcare claims databases and runs a 
website with information on initiatives taking place in each state (A. Council, 2015a). Using 
the APCD Council website enabled states that had scored poorly on the Report Card to 
nonetheless be considered for their alternate efforts. From the APCD Council website 
                                            
18 Catalyst for Payment Reform, founded in 2010, is “an independent, nonprofit corporation working on behalf 
of large employers and other health care purchasers to catalyze improvements in how we pay for health 
services and promote higher-value care in the U.S” (CPR, 2015). 
19 The Health Care Incentives Improvement Institute is a non-profit that resulted from a merger of Bridges to 
Excellence (programs to reward healthcare practitioners who meet certain performance measures) and 
PROMETHEUS Payment (a compensation approach based on medical episodes of care), and aims to improve 
health care quality and value with evidence-based incentive programs and a fair and powerful model for 
payment reform (HCI3, 2015). 
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emerged a list of all states with existing APCD systems: Colorado, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and 
Vermont.  
Table 1: Criteria for price transparency case selection  
 Criteria States meeting the criteria 
1. 2014 Report Card on State 
Price Transparency Laws 
Did the state’s price 
transparency receive a 
passing grade in 2014? 
Colorado  
Maine  
Massachusetts  
Vermont 
Virginia 
2. 2015 APCD Council list 
of state initiatives 
Does the state currently have 
an APCD? 
Colorado 
Kansas 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Minnesota 
New Hampshire 
Oregon 
Rhode Island 
Tennessee 
Utah 
Vermont 
(Source of information for table: A. Council, 2015a; Delbanco, 2014) 
 
Once states had been identified, four of the states’ initiatives were evaluated 
according to a conception of the consumer as boundedly rational. The four states analyzed 
were Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. The first step was to evaluate 
the consumer-friendliness of price transparency measures. As I established in Chapter 2, it 
will be necessary for price transparency to properly define the parameters in which 
consumers will make their decisions. New Hampshire was among the first states to build an 
APCD and allowing consumers to input their own insurance information and see what 
specific procedures will cost, and Massachusetts developed a consumer-friendly Web site 
showing the amount paid and quality side by side (CIVHC, 2014a). Other states started out 
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with information targeted for policymakers but are currently in the process of making 
information available to consumers.20 Next, the user-friendliness of the websites themselves 
was evaluated. User-friendliness can be enhanced by tailoring of information to the 
consumer’s needs. For instance, Maine’s website offers a “Cost Compare” feature, which 
allows consumers to select a procedure category, select a specific procedure from within that 
category, and see the average cost of that procedure at different health care facilities in 
Maine (MHDO, 2014). Finally, state price websites were evaluated on the basis of the 
completeness of information presented. For instance, one measure of completeness is 
whether there is information available on any given procedure from any given provider in 
the state. All criteria are described in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
20 For example, Virginia started collecting data for an all-payer claims database (APCD) in 2012, and projected 
to make its data available online in the spring of 2015. Virginia’s APCD data has two purposes: (1) improving 
public health surveillance, population health, and alternative delivery and payment models, and (2) enabling 
“healthcare purchasers, including employers and consumers, […] to compare quality and efficiency of 
healthcare” ("All-Payer Claims Database created; purpose; reporting requirements.," 2012; VHI, 2015). 
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Table 2: Criteria for price transparency case evaluation  
 Criteria States meeting the criteria 
1. User-friendliness of price 
measures 
Is price information specific 
enough for consumers to 
infer what their own 
treatment will cost, by 
providing: 
(a) Reimbursement in 
addition to 
chargemaster data? 
(b)  Procedure-specific 
in addition to or 
instead of overall 
hospital rates? 
Colorado 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
New Hampshire 
2. User-friendliness of 
website 
Does the website tailor 
information to the 
consumer’s specific needs 
through interactivity by: 
(a) Allowing comparison 
of specific hospitals? 
(b) Allowing searching 
by condition or 
treatment? 
Colorado 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
New Hampshire 
3. Completeness of 
information 
Is information available: 
(a) On any given 
procedure? 
(b) On all relevant 
payers? 
(c) On all relevant 
providers? 
(d) For all recent years? 
Colorado 
Massachusetts 
New Hampshire 
(Source of information for table: A. Council, 2015a; Delbanco, 2014) 
 
3.4.1 Colorado 
 
Colorado received a passing grade on the 2014 Report Card on State Price 
Transparency Laws (Delbanco, 2014). Its APCD has collected data since 2012, and the 
launch of the Colorado APCD public facing website was November 1, 2012 (A. Council, 
2015a). I will first provide a brief history of Colorado’s price transparency, then evaluate the 
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user-friendliness of its price measures and website, in addition to the completeness of 
information on its website.  
 Colorado’s All Payer Claims Database (APCD) legislation (Colorado House Bill 10-
1330) went into effect in late summer 2010. It was signed by then-Governor Bill Ritter 
(Democrat) on May 26, 2010. The legislation set out a number of required actions and 
milestones, including the appointment of an advisory committee to guide the creation of 
Colorado's APCD (A. Council, 2015a). In 2010, the advisory committee named the Center 
for Improving Value in Health Care (CIVHC), a non-profit organization, as the 
administrator for Colorado APCD (A. Council, 2015a). Treo Solutions, which offers 
consulting services and data analytics to commercial and government health plans, began 
collecting three years of historic claims information in early 2012 (A. Council, 2015a). 
 
User-friendliness of Colorado’s price measures 
The Colorado APCD public-facing website, Colorado Medical Price Compare, 
launched on November 1, 2012, providing high-level views of variation in cost and 
utilization for approximately two million commercial and Medicaid covered lives (A. 
Council, 2015a). Because there was no pricing on the medical services level, consumers 
could not estimate their treatment costs. As a result, it was not very useful for consumers 
deciding which hospital to use. In 2013, the Colorado APCD on-boarded additional claims 
data (including Medicare) and expanded the public reporting of comparative cost, quality and 
value information (A. Council, 2015a). 3 CCR 702-4:4-2-31, which was added in 2010 and 
last amended in 2013, marked the first legislation in Colorado that made public the paid 
amount, not charge, by requiring “the average of all reimbursement rates that a carrier paid, 
by MS-DRG code” to be “reported to the Division” (that is, reported to the state). In 2014, 
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Colorado Medical Price Compare included reports estimating the amount that a hospital, 
surgery center, physician or other health care professional receives for its services, and how 
much one would have to pay out-of-pocket for that service (CIVHC, 2014a).  
Another website available is Colorado Hospital Price Report, which predates 
Colorado Medical Price Compare and which is a joint project of the Colorado Hospital 
Association and the Colorado Division of Insurance. It is intended to provide consumers 
and purchasers of health care with information about hospital charges and insurance 
company or health maintenance organization reimbursement rates. The website includes the 
25 most common inpatient medical conditions and surgical procedures performed in 
Colorado hospitals in 2013. It includes reimbursement by company and by group code, for 
2009 through 2013.  
 
User-friendliness of Colorado’s website 
Although Colorado received a passing grade for its laws, its implementation did not, 
because the CPR 2014 report card rated the Colorado Hospital Price Report website instead 
of Colorado Medical Price Compare. The CPR 2014 report card rated Colorado Hospital 
Price Report, Colorado’s state-mandated website, as “poor” for utility and ease of use 
(Delbanco, 2014). Nonetheless, since 2013, a consumer can search Colorado Hospital Price 
Report for comprehensive prices for select hospital-based services, by location and insurance 
(A. Council, 2015a). This is the sort of tailoring that prevents information overload, thereby 
making it more likely that a boundedly rational consumer will make the optimal decision. 
Furthermore, the wording of Colorado legislation suggests that lawmakers are aware 
of the importance of a user-friendly website. Colorado Revised Statutes §10-16-134, added in 
2008, requires “the [Colorado Hospital Association’s] web site and information [to be] easy 
 44 
 
to navigate [and] contain consumer-friendly language.” Colorado Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-
0.031253-703 mandates disclosure of charge information “on an internet web site in a 
manner that allows consumers to conduct an interactive search that allows them to view and 
compare.” Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25.5-1-204, added in 2010 and amended in 2013, required 
both charge and paid amount to be made “available to the public […] in a consumer-friendly 
manner,” allowing “consumers to identify and compare health plans, health insurers, health 
care facilities, and health care providers regarding the provision of safe, cost-effective, high-
quality health care services.” 
Figure 6: Colorado Medical Price Compare (screenshot) 
 
(CIVHC, 2014b) 
 
Completeness of information on Colorado’s website 
The CPR 2014 report card rated Colorado Hospital Price Report, Colorado’s state-
mandated website, as “average” for the scope and accuracy of its data (Delbanco, 2014). 
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Although information is available on all relevant providers and for all recent years, 
information is not available on any given procedure. The initial launch of the website 
displayed price and quality information for a limited number of hospital-based services: total 
knee replacement, total hip replacement, uncomplicated vaginal birth, and cesarean birth. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-3-705, added in 2008 and amended in 2011, mandated that “each 
hospital” release “the mean charge” of “the twenty-give most common inpatient diagnostic-
related groups.” In 2015, approximately 30 procedures including imaging services across a 
variety of facility types are expected to be available. In addition, prices at the provider group 
level will eventually be incorporated, allowing consumers to evaluate common preventative 
services such as annual check-ups (CIVHC, 2014b). 
Information is not available on all payers. When launched, Colorado Medical Price 
Compare included data from 2009-2011 from the largest eight carriers in Colorado and from 
Medicaid, amounting to claims for over 2 million unique individuals, representing over 40% 
of insured Coloradans (CIVHC, 2012). As of December 2013, the APCD included 2009-
2012 historic claims data representing over 2.5 million Coloradans (CIVHC, 2012). Medical 
services prices were based on 2012 claims data. Self-funded commercial insurance claims 
data and claims for patients 65 and over were not included in the data (CIVHC, 2012). As of 
Version 2.0, the APCD includes health insurance claims from the 13 largest health plans for 
individual, large group fully insured and some self-insured lives, as well as Medicaid (CIVHC, 
2014a). 
3.4.2 Maine 
 
Maine HealthCost was introduced in May 2009 (Tu & Lauer, 2009). The Maine 
Health Data Organization (MHDO) collects data on health care claims for Maine residents. 
Maine Revised Statutes §8712, added in 2003 and most recently amended in 2012, requires 
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“health care facilities and practitioners” to make available “payments for services rendered” 
for elective procedures to the uninsured, so that the state can “create a publicly accessible 
interactive website.” Maine Revised Statutes §8712, added 2003 and last amended in 2012, 
requires “the release of prices paid by individual commercial health insurance companies, 3rd-
party administrators and, unless prohibited by federal law, governmental payors” for the 15 
most common diagnosis-related groups and outpatient procedures for all hospitals in the 
State. 
 
User-friendliness of Maine’s price measures and website 
 The CPR 2014 Report Card rated Maine’s state-mandated website as “excellent” in 
terms of accuracy of data. The average cost amount reported in HealthCost is the average 
payment to the provider for a procedure based on the claims data collected by the 
MHDO. The CPR 2014 Report Card rated Maine’s state-mandated website as “average” in 
terms of utility and ease of use. The Cost Compare function provides an overall idea of a 
procedure’s average cost by facility (MHDO, 2014). Overall, Maine’s price measures and 
websites effectively tailor price information to the consumer’s needs, thereby anticipating the 
constraints of bounded rationality. 
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Figure 7: Maine HealthCost (screenshot) 
 
 
Completeness of information on Maine’s website 
The CPR 2014 Report Card rated Maine’s state-mandated website as “good” in 
terms of scope. Maine’s website does not include information on all relevant providers. On 
the MHDO’s website, it presents the average cost of specific medical procedures at over 50 
different high-volume health care facilities and hospitals around the state. The current site 
includes data from providers who are part of a health care facility. Approximately 80 percent 
of primary care physicians and 50 percent of specialists are employed by a health care facility 
or hospital (MHDO, 2014). 
Maine’s website does not include information on all procedures. Users can compare 
the average cost of approximately 200 procedures at over 50 high volume health care 
facilities and hospitals. Neither does Maine’s website include information on all relevant 
payers. The information used to calculate the average cost is from claims data collected by 
MHDO (as required by law) from all licensed health plans in the State and third-party 
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administrators. The MHDO reviewed over 7 million claims from 42 health insurance 
providers. At present, it does not include Medicaid and Medicare claims data. 
Nor does Maine HealthCost include information for all recent years. The data in this 
release cover the time period of July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013. Q1 2014 APCD Data was 
released in August 2014, and includes commercial claims and MaineCare data (A. Council, 
2015a).  
3.4.3 Massachusetts 
 
My Health Care Options has been live since late 2008.21 The Massachusetts All-Payer 
Claims Database began collecting claims data in 2008, with claims dating back to July 2006. 
In summer 2012, the Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy released a 
“preliminary release” of APCD datasets based on private payer data from 2008-2010. That 
November, the Center for Health Information and Analysis (CHIA) assumed responsibility 
for the MA APCD. Release 1.0, which CHIA made available in June 2013, included data for 
2009 through 2011 from both private and public payers. CHIA finalized Release 2.0, which 
included data for 2009-2012, in January 2014 (CHIA, 2014). CHIA’s APCD data is only 
released in custom abstracts to users who make it through a multi-layer screening process, 
although it is used in conjunction with other data sources to create the My Health Care 
Options ratings (CHIA, 2014).  
                                            
21 I have concluded this from triangulating from a few sources: The Massachusetts House FY2010 budget 
recommendation, published in 2009, referred to “the Council’s recently launched ‘My Health Care Options’ 
website” (Patrick & Murray, 2009). More concretely, archive.org’s Wayback Machine saved the website 308 
times between December 12, 2008 and August 17, 2014 (Archive, 2014). I cannot tell from the archived 
version which medical conditions were available for cost and quality comparisons, though there is an 
announcement on the version archived on December 25, 2010, stating: “This Website was enhanced in July 
2010 to include updated acute care hospital quality measures, updated text and links, and the addition of 
medical groups' clinical quality data from the Massachusetts Health Quality Partners (MHQP).” The website 
also received an update in 2010, according to an August 2010 blog post (Guiltinan, 2010). 
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The statute creating the Massachusetts Health Care Quality and Cost Council statute 
expresses a desire to improve health care quality, reduce racial and ethnic disparities and 
contain health care costs (A. Council, 2015a). The authority to collect claims data was 
established under the same legislation that established the Council (A. Council, 2015a). Since 
then, the Division was given authority, under a separate bill, to examine cost containment 
(A. Council, 2015a). 
 
User-friendliness of Massachusetts’ price measures and website 
Massachusetts General Laws 12C §8 Part (d), added in 2012, require the public 
reporting of and placement on the state website of inpatient and outpatient relative prices. 
The Massachusetts Health Care Quality and Cost Council was established to design a 
consumer-friendly website that would provide transparency about healthcare costs and 
quality for the public. My Health Care Options allows comparison of specific hospitals and 
allows searching by condition or treatment, as shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Massachusetts My Health Care Options (screenshot) 
 
(H. C. Q. a. C. Council, 2014) 
 
Completeness of information on Massachusetts’ website 
The Division adopted new regulations in July 2010 and includes the collection of 
medical claims and information from member eligibility, provider, and product files 
encompassing fully-insured, self-insured, Medicare, and Medicaid data (A. Council, 2015a). 
As of 2010, the Health Care Quality and Cost Council had collected insurance carrier claims 
data on the privately, fully insured for nearly three years. It posted currently posts data on 19 
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inpatient conditions and 18 diagnostic tests on its consumer website, My Health Care 
Options (DHCFP, 2010).  
In 2012, Massachusetts’ regulation 129 MA ADC 2.05 was added, requiring “each 
carrier” (of insurance) to “submit to the Council” “a completed health care claims data set” 
“for all Massachusetts resident members.” Also in 2012, Massachusetts’ regulation 129 MA 
ADC 2.09 was added, requiring “carriers” to report “medical and pharmacy claims” and 
“claims for capitated services […] at the visit, service, or prescription level.” Further 
regulation requires the reporting of financial and other information to the state.22  
 
3.4.4 New Hampshire 
 
I will first provide a brief history of New Hampshire’s price transparency, then 
evaluate the user-friendliness of its price measures and website, in addition to the 
completeness of information on its website. NH HealthCost, launched in 2007, is a publicly 
available website that provides median bundled prices for about 20 common, mostly 
outpatient, services, using the claims data from New Hampshire’s all-payer claims database 
(Tu & Gourevitch, 2014). The New Hampshire Comprehensive Healthcare Information 
System began accepting claims submissions in 2005 in response to a need for more 
transparency in the commercial insurance system. The drivers listed in the statute include the 
provision of a resource for continuous review of health care utilization, expenditures, and 
performance data by insurers, purchasers, employers, providers and state agencies (Tu & 
Gourevitch, 2014). Also expressed was the goal to help consumers and employers make 
informed and cost effective health care choices (Tu & Gourevitch, 2014). 
                                            
22 See 101 MA ADC 345.05, 114.1 CMR 17.03, 114.1 CMR 17.01, 114.1 CMR 39.03, 40.03, 42.03, 42.04, 114.5 
CMR 21.03, 957 CMR 2.01, 957 CMR 2.05 (Delbanco, 2014). 
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In addition, the NH Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Medicaid 
Business and Policy (OMPB), wanted to be able to compare Medicaid quality, cost, 
utilization, and price to those of other payers (Tu & Gourevitch, 2014). For the OMPB, the 
reporting agenda is focused on how health care quality, access, use, and cost vary 
geographically, between providers, and most importantly between the Medicaid-covered and 
commercially insured populations as well as benchmarking of payment rates (Tu & 
Gourevitch, 2014). 
 
User-friendliness of New Hampshire’s price measures and website 
The NHID uses claims data to better understand the health insurance market in 
New Hampshire as well as to provide New Hampshire residents with information about the 
cost of health care services. To date, the NHID has developed the NH HealthCost website 
for insurers and is in the process of developing a second website for employers (A. Council, 
2015a). NH HealthCost allows comparison of specific hospitals and allows searching by 
condition or treatment type. Furthermore, it allows website users to enter details about their 
insurance carrier and the specifics of their plan, then tailors results to that information, as 
shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: New Hampshire HealthCost (screenshot) 
 
Completeness of information on New Hampshire’s website 
HealthCost provides median bundled prices for about 20 common, mostly 
outpatient, services, using the claims data from New Hampshire’s all-payer claims database 
(Tu & Gourevitch, 2014). Its data includes all providers and major payers.  
3.5 Private initiatives for price transparency 
 
Private initiatives for price transparency do not have the force of law behind them, 
but can result in useful websites through stakeholder support. Examples of state-specific 
private initiatives for price transparency include Montana Hospital Association PricePoint 
system website, the California Foundation, and the Oregon Association of Hospitals and 
Health Systems PricePoint system website.  
On the nationwide level, we see Castlight Health was founded in 2008 and is a 
healthcare information company that offers comparison tools for the price and quality of 
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healthcare providers (Castlight, 2015). Its clients include self-insured companies such as Wal-
Mart and Honeywell (Campbell, 2014). 
OpsCost is a privately run website that allows charge comparison for common 
procedures at over 3,000 hospitals using data from the government and from user-reported 
bills (OpsCost, 2015). When evaluated according to the criteria used earlier for state 
transparency websites, OpsCost performs reasonably well. Its price measures are not very 
user-friendly, providing both billed and reimbursed amounts. However, they are tailored to 
specific providers. The website is user-friendly, tailoring information to the consumer’s 
specific needs, and it allows the comparison of specific hospitals. Finally, it includes 
information on all treatment types. 
The design of insurance plans impacts the effectiveness of price transparency. 
Patients with high-deductible plans will tend to be more price-sensitive, for instance. The 
Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI) was established in 2011 to draw on health care cost and 
utilization data for Americans covered by private insurance (HCCI, 2015). Through research 
and access to a large health insurance claims database, HCCI addresses health care spending 
and utilization for the privately insured health population (HCCI, 2015). Its data 
contributors are Aetna, Humana, Kaiser Permanente, and UnitedHealthcare (HCCI, 2015).  
In 2015, HCCI launched guroo, a consumer-focused website providing national, 
state, and local cost and quality information for common conditions and services based on 
data from around 40 million Americans (HCCI, 2015). When evaluated according to the 
same criteria used for state transparency websites, guroo performs reasonably well. Its price 
measures are user-friendly, providing procedure-specific cost estimates. However, they are 
not tailored to specific providers, but rather to the geographic region, which is less useful for 
a consumer trying to decide which hospital to attend. The website is user-friendly, tailoring 
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information to the consumer’s specific needs, but it does not allow the comparison of 
specific hospitals. Finally, its information is incomplete: there are conditions not yet 
included. 
With the connection between insurance and healthcare prices, it is unsurprising that 
we see insurance companies beginning to engage in transparency. In 2010, Aetna introduced 
Member Payment Estimator, an online tool enabling members to estimate costs (HFMA, 
2015). It allows estimates of both in-network and out-of-network physician care costs 
(HFMA, 2015). Not to be outperformed, in 2012, UnitedHealthcare launched a consumer 
cost estimator tool for in-network hospitals and physicians: myHealthcare Cost Estimator, 
or myHCE (UnitedHealthcare, 2015). For those covered by UnitedHealthcare, it should be 
very useful, providing the ability for consumers to compare quality and cost for more than 
574,900 different healthcare providers and 4,275 hospitals (UnitedHealthcare, 2015). 
Meanwhile, Humana currently offers MyChoice Tools for provider comparison (Humana, 
2015). 
3.6 Chapter conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the current state of affairs for price transparency in the 
U.S. hospital market, including evidence of Republicans and Democrats advocating for price 
transparency. Without changes in insurance benefit designs to encourage patients to choose 
high-value providers, price transparency will have limited impact. The examples included 
also highlighted the disjunction between what makes sense to consumers and what the 
healthcare industry is currently doing, thereby dealing with the ethical aspects of price 
transparency in addition to the political and economic.
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Chapter 4 Implementing quality transparency  
 
 
In 2012, Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center’s patient safety made headlines when 
it received an F on Leapfrog Group’s scoring of the hospital (Terhune, 2012). Since then, 
Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center has risen to a C for Leapfrog Group ratings (Terhune, 
2015). Leapfrog Group is an employer-backed nonprofit focused on healthcare quality, and 
is one of a growing number of healthcare rating organizations seeking to provide more 
information to consumers and employers (Terhune, 2012).  
More recently, between October 2014 and January 2015, over 100 patients at Ronald 
Reagan UCLA Medical Center23 were exposed to an antibiotic-resistant bacterium spread by 
endoscopes (AP, 2015). Two patient deaths have already been attributed to the bacterium 
(AP, 2015). In January 2014, Virginia Mason Medical Center in Seattle announced that 32 
patients were infected with a similar bacterial strain, due to contaminated endoscopes being 
used between 2012 and 2014, resulting in eleven deaths during that time (Terhune, 2015). 
These news stories speak to the sometimes-fraught role that quality transparency 
plays in the U.S. hospital industry, whether initiated by the media, private rankings groups, or 
the federal government. Quality in healthcare can be a matter of life or death, unlike in some 
other industries—for example, in retail, a poor-quality shirt is not newsworthy. Yet, in 
industries like retail, there are clear indicators of quality—name brands, jaw-dropping price 
tags—that are not present to the same extent in healthcare. The U.S. hospital industry does 
                                            
23 Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center appeared on 225 U.S. News and World Report “Best Hospital” lists 
between 2001 and 2014, for its performance in various specialties including: oncology, gastroenterology, 
geriatrics, gynecology, cardiology, endocrinology, nephrology, orthopedics, urology, and rheumatology 
(USNWR, Cooper, Craig, & Russell, 2015).  
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have its name brands—Mayo Clinic, Mass Gen, Cleveland Clinic—but since they are 
geographically inaccessible for many Americans, there have not traditionally been useful 
“brand name” heuristics for Americans choosing where to have their cancer treatment.  
*** 
This chapter evaluates the quality transparency initiatives currently available. It 
demonstrates the gap between the concept of quality transparency and its implementation. 
Many different measures can be used to quantify and communicate quality of care. These 
measures can be grouped into three categories: processes of care, outcomes of care, and 
patient experience (NCQA, 2007). First, processes of care can be synthesized in practice 
guidelines, which are specific sets of care recommendations designed to help healthcare 
professionals and patients make decisions about preventing or treating a condition, 
developed through review of the best available medical evidence or an expert consensus 
process where evidence is lacking (NCQA, 2007).24 The second category focuses on 
outcomes of care, such as readmission and mortality rates.25 The third category is patient 
experiences, which can include pain management and quality of communication with 
practitioners.26  
The source of quality can determine the measures it reports. For example, Medicare’s 
Hospital Compare provides information about the quality of care at over 4,000 Medicare-
certified hospitals, including readmissions, complications, and deaths, while the Leapfrog 
                                            
24 For example, the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) tells employers and consumers 
know how well their care follows practice guidelines, such as the percentage of heart attack patients who are 
given a beta-blocker to prevent another heart attack (NCQA, 2007). 
25 The Medicare Health Outcomes Survey (HOS) assesses the physical and mental well-being of people 
enrolled in managed care plans (NCQA, 2007). Its first cohort was surveyed in 1998 and resurveyed in 2000 
(HOS, 2014). 
26 The Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) consists of surveys asking 
consumers and patients to report on their healthcare experiences (NCQA, 2007). 
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Group provides voluntarily reported hospital survey results on how patients fare, resources 
used in caring for patients, and structures that promote patient safety. 
4.1 Existing work on quality transparency 
 
Several studies have found evidence of a significant consumer response to health 
plan ratings when assessing the impact of health plan ratings on consumer choice (Wedig 
and Tai-Seale, 2002; Scanlon et al., 2002; Chernew et al., 2004; Jin and Sorensen, 2005; 
Dafny and Dranove, 2005). In the next sections, I present the evidence for consumers using 
health plan ratings, consumers shopping around for providers, and the impact of consumer 
choice on providers.  
4.1.1 Consumers using health plan ratings 
 
Wedig and Tai-Seale (2002) test the effect of report cards on consumer choice in the 
HMO market. The OPM provided health insurance plan selections of a sample of federal 
employees in 1995 and 1996, which was used to match a new hire sample of 649 new hires 
in 1995 and 713 new hires in 1996 with a stratified random sample of 4,150 existing hire 
choices in 1996 and 3,650 existing hire choices in 1995 (Wedig, 2002). Wedig and Tai-Seale 
found statistically significant results at p < 0.05, demonstrating that an increase of one 
standard deviation in a report card measure of quality of care increases the likelihood of plan 
selection by more than 50 percent (Wedig, 2002). Overall, they offered evidence that 
subjective measures of quality and coverage influence plan choices. 
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4.1.2 Consumers shopping around for providers 
 
Less work has been done on the effect of rankings and report cards on patients’ 
choice of provider. Pope (2009) demonstrates that changes in a hospital’s ranking by the US 
News and World Report increases non-emergency patient volume and hospital revenue. The 
New York State Cardiac Surgery Reporting System provides information on the risk-
adjusted mortality rates of hospitals performing coronary artery bypass surgery. Cutler et al. 
(2004) show a decrease in patient volume for hospitals that performed significantly below 
the state average, but no evidence that hospitals performing significantly above average 
attracted more patients. Meanwhile, Jha and Epstein (2006) present evidence that New York 
Cardiac Surgery ratings did not impact the market share of cardiac patients.  
Work on the role of patient choice in healthcare has provided evidence in support of 
the right kind of transparency. Estimating the impact of hospital competition in the English 
National Health Service following January 2006 reforms, Cooper et al. (2009) presented 
results suggesting that hospital competition in markets with fixed prices can lead to 
improvements in clinical quality, using AMI mortality to indicate quality and a modified 
difference-in-difference estimator. Cutler and Dafny (2011) recommend transparency 
initiatives mandating the disclosure of plan-specific patient copayments, to avoid the wrong 
kind of transparency, which could harm patients by leading to higher prices. Rosenthal et al. 
(2013) found it difficult to obtain bundled price information for a common elective surgical 
procedure, indicating pervasive barriers to informed patient choice in the hospital market.  
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The literature provides mixed evidence on the consequences of report cards for 
healthcare provider performance. Surveys of patients and clinicians reveal both that report 
cards can have little effect on decision-making (Schneider & Epstein, 1998) and that they can 
have a significant effect on patient placement (Schneider & Epstein, 1996). Schneider and 
Epstein’s 1996 study suggests that publication of quality data can significantly impact 
healthcare provider performance, but not due to increased patient choice. Analysis of clinical 
and administrative data shows that report cards catalyzed improvement in the quality of care 
(Hannan, 1994; Peterson, 1998), lending support to the argument that quality transparency 
can incentivize healthcare providers to perform better.  
4.1.3 The impact of consumer choice on providers 
 
The articles reviewed were largely within the field of health economics, and provided 
a framework for understanding what sort of information was already publicly available and 
what to look for. An article by Devin Pope (2009) influenced the decision to create a dataset 
of the U.S. News and World Report rankings of hospitals for 2001 through 2014. Pope’s 
paper includes useful information on how the U.S. News Best Hospital rankings are put 
together. The U.S. News and World Report rankings of hospitals is a widely dispersed listing 
of the top hospitals (up to 50 rank slots) in each of up to 17 specialties (Pope, 2009). It has 
been released annually since 1993, and U.S. News and World Report states that it determines 
the rankings according to the following steps (Pope, 2009). First, the hospital must be a 
member of the Council of Teaching Hospitals, affiliated with a medical school, or in 
possession of certain technological capabilities. (Pope notes that each year, only one-third of 
the approximately 6,000 U.S. hospitals meet one of the following criteria.) Second, the 
hospital’s reputation is measured by the percentage of surveyed physicians who indicated the 
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hospital specialty as one of the top five hospitals in that specialty. Third, the hospital-
specialty’s mortality rate is measured. Finally, other observable hospital characteristics are 
taken to account (e.g., nurses-to-beds ratio, number of patients treated, specialty-specific 
technologies available). 
As a counterpart to the stated methodology of the U.S. News and World Report, 
Pope also produces analysis of what actually drives the rankings. Namely, he shows that 
reputation scores explain over 95 percent of the variation in the final quality scores, while 
risk-adjusted mortality rates explain less than one percent (Pope, 2009). Pope also offers 
valuable information on how widely perceived the U.S. News and World Report rankings 
seem to be. Specifically, he cites the U.S. News and World Report magazine circulation of 
over 2 million27 and the free online availability of the rankings (Pope, 2009).  
Pope’s study shows that U.S. News Best Hospital rankings have a large impact on 
hospital choice decisions. Yet, consumers of health care may be relatively unresponsive to 
change in hospital quality. Pope estimates the response to rankings in the hospital market 
(Pope, 2009). He finds that hospitals that improve their rank attract significantly more 
patients, by using hospital rankings released by US News and World Report as a proxy for 
perceived quality (Pope, 2009). The rankings are broken down by specialty, so he produces 
counts of treated patients at the hospital-specialty level. He then estimates the patient 
response to these rankings. Pope uses a dummy variable for each hospital specialty, to 
control for time in varying hospital characteristics (size, culture), but it does not control for 
the number of patients per year. Using mixed and conditional logit estimates of hospital 
choice, he shows that distance has a bigger effect than quality. Because patients make 
appointments far in advance, which could contaminate results, he uses a falsification test. 
                                            
27 For a point of reference, the top-ranked U.S. consumer magazine for the second half of 2013, based on 
circulation, was the AARP magazine, with 22,274,096 subscribers as of 12/31/2013 (Media, 2014). 
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For the falsification test, he shows that a rank change occurring in a subsequent year does 
not have an effect on this year’s patient counts. He shows that the average hospital in his 
sample experiences a 5% change in non-emergency, Medicare patient volume from year to 
year due to rank changes.  
Recent work in behavioral economics suggests that simplicity of information content 
is an important factor in consumer behavior, and U.S. News seems to have come up with a 
system that consumers are can easily to grasp. If one assumes that the sample of hospitals 
used in this analysis is representative of the nation as a whole, changes in these hospital 
rankings have led to over 15,000 Medicare patients switching from lower to higher-ranked 
hospitals for inpatient care, resulting in over 750 million dollars moving from one hospital to 
another over the past ten years. But to understand the entire impact of these rankings, it will 
be necessary to know whether the response of hospitals to the rankings is efficiency 
increasing or decreasing.  
Contributing a cautionary note to the dialogue, Dranove et al. (2003) use national 
data on Medicare patients at risk for cardiac surgery and cardiac surgery report cards in New 
York and Pennsylvania to measure the impact of publishing information on providers’ 
performance (Dranove, Kessler, McClellan, & Satterthwaite, 2003). Dranove et al. examine 
the effects of mandatory CABG surgery report card laws adopted by New York and 
Pennsylvania in the early 1990s. Hospital-level trends indicate report card-induced matching, 
and patient-level analysis showed that report cards led to an increase in the quantity of 
CABG surgery, a decrease in PTCA, and increased delays in the execution of all three 
intensive treatments. Their results suggest that report cards can lead to short-term reductions 
in welfare by leading to selection behavior by providers, which leads to worse health 
outcomes for sicker patients (Dranove et al., 2003). 
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4.2 Barriers to quality transparency 
 
In the previous chapter on price transparency, we saw that more Republicans than 
Democrats tend to advocate for price transparency more than Democrats. Here, I show that 
more Democrats than Republicans have supported quality transparency measures on the 
federal and state level. Analysis of seven quality transparency bills on the federal level from 
2007 to 2014 showed that 82.5 percent of sponsors were Democrats.28 With a sample size of 
140 sponsors, that percentage was statistically significant at a 99.99 percent confidence 
interval (t = 7.5601; p < 0.0001). Even when dropping all observations from H.R. 4841 
(2014), which had 43 sponsors, the percentage of Democratic sponsors (70.5 percent) is 
statistically significant (t = 2.4861; p = 0.0146). Recalling similar analysis from Chapter 3, the 
partisan composition of sponsorship differs significantly between price and quality (t = 
5.3326; p < 0.0001), even when dropping observations from H.R. 4841 (2014) (t = 5.1993; p 
< 0.0001). 
                                            
28 These seven bills—H.R. 3230 (2014), H.R. 4841 (2014), S. 2450 (2014), H.R. 2853 (2013), H.R. 4803 (2010), 
H.R. 2723 (2007), and S. 1226 (2007)—were found through using the terms “quality,” “transparency,” and 
“healthcare” to search ProQuest Congressional Publications. To increase the timeliness of the findings, the 
search results were limited to the year 2007 onward. 
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Figure 10: Federal legislation for quality transparency: Partisan sponsorship of 
House and Senate bills (chart) 
 
(Sources for information in chart: Delbanco, 2014; Impulse, 2015) 
 
The trend of Democrats pushing for quality transparency is even more apparent on 
the state level. Of 29 pieces of quality transparency legislation passed in 13 states between 
1989 and 2013, 63.89 percent passed when state legislatures were a majority Democrats (t = 
1.557; p = 0.131), and 65.63 percent passed when the state governor was a Democrat (t = 
1.772; p = 0.087) (sources of information: Delbanco, 2014; NCSL, 2015a; analysis mine).  
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Figure 11: State legislation for quality transparency: Partisan control of state 
legislature and party affiliation of governor when legislation passed (chart) 
 
(Sources of information: Delbanco, 2014; NCSL, 2015a; analysis mine) 
 
The partisan composition of legislatures when transparency legislation passes does 
not differ significantly between price and quality (t = 0.349; p = 0.728), nor does the party 
affiliation of the governor (t = 0.523; p = 0.601). 
4.3 Federal initiatives for quality transparency 
 
The main federal initiative for quality transparency is Medicare Hospital Compare, 
which is a website available to the public. Hospital Compare enables patients to compare the 
quality of different hospitals (Medicare, 2015a). Hospital Compare has information about the 
quality of care at over 4,000 Medicare-certified hospitals (Medicare, 2015c). Similar Medicare 
services are Physician Compare, Nursing Home Compare, Home Health Compare, Dialysis 
Facility Compare, Medicare Plan Finder, and Supplier Directory (Medicare, 2015a).  
Hospital Compare was created through the efforts of the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS), in collaboration with organizations representing consumers, 
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hospitals, doctors, employers, accrediting organizations, and other Federal agencies 
(Medicare, 2015c). Prior to Hospital Compare, the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA; now CMS) sought to publish nationwide hospital-specific mortality data beginning 
in the mid-1980s. The effort was not widely used by consumers and ended in the early 
1990s, partly due to criticism for the HCFA’s lack of risk adjustment (Dudley, Rittenhouse, 
& Bae, 2002). In 1990, the National Committee for Quality Assurance’s (NCQA) was 
founded, and began administering Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set 
(HEDIS), which now forms the basis for the NCQA’s accreditation of more than 90% of 
America’s health plans through measurement of performance for care and service (NCQA, 
2015b). Starting in 1999, the federal government re-entered public reporting with 
comparative performance reports for providers that participate in Medicare; these reports 
included Health Plan Compare, Nursing Home Compare, Home Health Compare, and 
Dialysis Compare (C. o. t. F. o. R. H. Care, 2005). 
Medicare Hospital Compare is able to have such thorough data because hospital 
reimbursements are tied to reporting. The Hospital Inpatient Quality Reporting program was 
originally mandated by Section 501(b) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003, which authorized CMS to pay reporting hospitals a higher 
annual update to payment rates, and a lower rate to non-reporters (CMS, 2015c).  
In 2005, a consortium of organizations initiated an effort now called the Hospital 
Quality Alliance (HQA) to establish a national database to provide information on the 
quality of care provided by hospitals (Jha, Li, Orav, & Epstein, 2005).  The organizations 
involved were CMS, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
(JCAHO), the American Hospital Association, and consumer groups such as the American 
Association of Retired Persons (Jha et al., 2005). Under the HQA, hospitals nationwide 
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report data to CMS on indicators of quality of care for three conditions: acute myocardial 
infarction, congestive heart failure, and pneumonia (Jha et al., 2005). HQA data on 10 quality 
indicators first became publicly available on November 30, 2004, and were updated on April 
1, 2005 (Jha et al., 2005).  
Between April 2005 and September 2010, the amount of publicly available 
information expanded to include 30-day hospital readmission, mortality rates, patient 
experience of their hospital care, steps to prevent surgical infections, and hospital outpatient 
measures (AHA, FAH, & AAMC, 2010). Specifically, CMS and the HQA began publicly 
reporting 30-day mortality measures for acute myocardial infarction and heart failure in June 
2007, and for pneumonia in June 2008, and has since expanded the publicly reported 
outcome measures to include 30-day readmission for these conditions, complications and 
readmission data for hip/knee replacements, and in-hospital adverse events and mortality 
(CMS, 2015d). Its stated rationale is that “publicly reporting these measures increases the 
transparency of hospital care, provides useful information for consumers choosing care, and 
assists hospitals in their quality improvement efforts” (CMS, 2015d). Using claims and 
administrative data, CMS annually calculates the following categories of outcome measures 
based on claims and administrative data for public reporting (CMS, 2015d). 
Table 3: CMS categories of outcome measures for public reporting 
30-day risk-standardized 
mortality measures 
 
30-day risk-standardized 
readmission measures 
AHRQ Patient Safety 
Indicators (PSIs) 
 
Acute Myocardial 
Infarction 
Acute Myocardial 
Infarction 
PSI 04: Death among surgical 
inpatients with serious treatable 
complications 
Heart Failure 
 
Heart Failure 
 
PSI 90: Composite—
complications/patient safety for 
selected indicators 
Pneumonia Pneumonia  
 Hip/Knee  
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The survey of patients’ experience that appears on Hospital Compare comes from 
the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) Survey 
(CMS, 2015b). The HCAHPS Survey was created by CMS with AHRQ, and is administered 
to a random sample of patients continuously throughout the year (CMS, 2015b). Hospital-
level results are publicly reported on Hospital Compare four times a year, and are based on 
four quarters of data on a rolling basis (CMS, 2015b). 
When Hospital Compare was first rolled out, to initiate the reporting effort, CMS 
selected 10 measures of the quality of care that have been widely endorsed and that are 
considered valid and feasible for immediate public reporting (Jha et al., 2005). These 10 
measures reflect the quality of care for three major clinical conditions: acute myocardial 
infarction, congestive heart failure, and pneumonia (Jha et al., 2005). There were five 
measures of the quality of care for acute myocardial infarction: the use or nonuse of aspirin 
within 24 hours before or after arrival at the hospital and at discharge, the use or nonuse of a 
beta-blocker within 24 hours after arrival and at discharge, and the use or nonuse of an 
angiotensin-converting–enzyme (ACE) inhibitor for left ventricular systolic dysfunction (Jha 
et al., 2005). Two measures were used for congestive heart failure: assessment of left 
ventricular function and the use or nonuse of an ACE inhibitor for left ventricular 
dysfunction (Jha et al., 2005). Three measures were used for pneumonia: the timing of initial 
antibiotic therapy, the presence or absence of pneumococcal vaccination, and assessment of 
oxygenation (Jha et al., 2005).  
One strategy the government has used to accelerate the implementation of quality 
measures has been the linkage of financial incentives to reporting. The Medicare 
Modernization Act, passed in 2003, established financial incentives for hospitals to provide 
the CMS with data on these 10 indicators of quality (Jha et al., 2005). Much more recently, 
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under the Affordable Care Act’s attempt to curb avoidable adverse events in acute care 
hospitals, Yale-New Haven Hospital is set to receive 1% lower Medicare reimbursements 
between October 2014 and September 15, due to one of the highest rates of hospital-
acquired infections in the country (Uchegbu, 2015).  
Yet, even this national initiative ran into difficulties in the implementation stage. The 
controversy surrounding Hospital Compare speaks to challenges facing transparency 
initiatives more broadly. A Quality Advisory sent to hospitals on September 8, 2010 by the 
American Hospital Association (AHA), Federation of American Hospitals, and AAMC 
stated that information on hospital-acquired conditions (HACs) would be available on 
Hospital Compare, and warned that “the release of HAC rates may generate interest from 
patients, your community and the media” (AHA et al., 2010). The Advisory also noted that 
hospitals would have only 9 days to review their data prior to the data being made available 
to the public in a downloadable file on September 23, 2010. The Advisory listed the eight 
HACs to be provided—foreign object retained after surgery; air embolism; blood 
incompatibility; pressure ulcer stages III and IV; falls and trauma; vascular catheter-
associated infection; catheter-associated urinary tract infection; and manifestations of poor 
glycemic control—and noted that the data would be available solely via download, rather 
than displayed similarly to the rest of the data available on Hospital Compare (AHA et al., 
2010).  
The Quality Advisory summarizes the legislative push that led to HACs being 
publicly reported. It states that Congress included a provision in the Deficit Reduction Act 
(section 5001(c)) to direct the Secretary to begin collecting data on whether complications 
were acquired during hospitalization and to stop paying the higher complicated MS-DRG 
payment for selected conditions (AHA et al., 2010). The motivation for this provision was a 
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concern that the payment system might reward hospitals for substandard care by paying 
extra when a patient developed a HAC (AHA et al., 2010).  
The timeline established by Section 5001(c) of the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act was 
that on October 1, 2007, the Secretary of Health and Human Services would select at least 
two hospital-acquired conditions that were high cost, high volume, or both; that would result 
in a diagnosis-related grouping with a higher payment if present as a secondary diagnosis; 
and that could have reasonably been prevented through the application of evidence-based 
guidelines (CMS, 2007). Then, on October 1, 2008, the reimbursement charges based on 
hospitals receiving no additional payment from CMS is the hospital-acquired condition was 
listed as a secondary diagnosis and if there was no documentation that the condition was 
present on admission to the healthcare facility come into effect (CMS, 2007). 
A term that appears frequently in the Quality Advisory is “consensus-based entities” 
(AHA et al., 2010). Examples of such entities include the National Quality Forum (NQF) 
and the HQA (AHA et al., 2010). One concern raised in the Quality Advisory is that CMS 
has not released publicly available specifications for the calculation of HAC rates, so they 
have not been reviewed by consensus-based entities, which “is an essential step in the quality 
measure development process” (AHA et al., 2010). 
Another recent controversy surrounding Hospital Compare is that most hospitals are 
required to report quality scores, but critical access hospitals can do so voluntarily, resulting 
in only one in three critical access hospitals reporting their emergency room quality measures 
(Rau, 2014). A critical access hospital is defined as a hospital with no more than 25 beds; 
they are usually located in isolated areas, and constitute 25% of hospitals in the US (Rau, 
2014). Some states have very few critical access hospitals—Connecticut, Delaware, DC, 
Maryland, New Jersey, and Rhode Island have none—while they constitute the majority of 
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hospitals in other states (Rau, 2014). For example, 80% of hospitals in North Dakota are 
critical access—the highest proportion in any state—followed closely by 76% in Montana, 
71% in Nebraska, and 69% in Iowa (Rau, 2014). 
From these federal quality transparency examples, we have learned the difficulties of 
presenting useful information to consumers without stepping on toes. Let us now turn to 
the initiatives that individual states have implemented. 
4.4 State initiatives for quality transparency 
 
Different states have taken very different approaches to quality transparency. Their 
approaches differ in terms of the measures of quality, the modes of presentation, and the 
content presented. This section focuses on cases of states implementing quality transparency 
successfully. Their approaches differ based on the measures of quality, the modes of 
presentation, and the content presented. As discussed earlier, of 29 pieces of quality 
transparency legislation passed in 13 states between 1989 and 2013, 63.89 percent passed 
when state legislatures were a majority Democrats (t = 1.557; p = 0.131), and 65.63 percent 
passed when the state governor was a Democrat (t = 1.772; p = 0.087) (sources of 
information: Delbanco, 2014; NCSL, 2015a; analysis mine). 
Example states were selected through a multi-step process. First were isolated those 
states that received passing grades on the 2014 State Report Card on Transparency of 
Physician Quality Information (HCI3, 2014). The Report Card was released in 2013 and 
again in 2014 by the Health Care Incentives Improvement Institute (HCI3, 2014).29 The 
report card reviews the (1) state-specific types of quality information on physicians, (2) state-
                                            
29 The Health Care Incentives Improvement Institute is a non-profit that resulted from a merger of Bridges to 
Excellence (programs to reward healthcare practitioners who meet certain performance measures) and 
PROMETHEUS Payment (a compensation approach based on medical episodes of care), and aims to improve 
health care quality and value with evidence-based incentive programs and a fair and powerful model for 
payment reform (HCI3, 2015). 
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specific amount of publicly available quality information on physicians and clinicians, and (3) 
how recent the state-specific quality information is (HCI3, 2014). The grading criteria can be 
viewed in the report. The report leveraged the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s national 
directory of public web-based resources available in each state (HCI3, 2014). Only ten states 
received passing grades: California, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New 
Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin (HCI3, 2014). 
Next, those states were cross-referenced with the NCQA list of 39 states requiring 
the use of HEDIS/CAHPS for both Medicaid and commercial managed care (NCQA, 
2015a). NCQA’s HEDIS Compliance Audit process is consistent with the CMS protocol for 
validating performance measures. Many states, the federal government (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services and the Office of Personnel Management), and other purchasers use 
HEDIS measures for quality improvement, benchmarking and pay for performance 
(NCQA, 2015a). Using the NCQA website listing enabled states that had scored poorly on 
the Report Card to nonetheless be considered for their alternate efforts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Criteria for quality transparency case selection   
 Criteria Successful states 
1. 2014 State report card on Did the state’s quality California 
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transparency of physician 
quality information 
transparency receive a 
passing grade in 2014? 
Maine 
Massachusetts  
Minnesota 
Missouri 
New Mexico 
Ohio 
Oregon 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
2. NCQA list of 39 states 
requiring the use of 
HEDIS/CAHPS 
Does the state currently 
requiring the use of 
HEDIS/CAHPS for both 
commercial managed care 
and Medicaid 
California 
Connecticut 
Florida 
Georgia 
Indiana 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Missouri 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
Rhode Island 
Texas 
Utah 
Virginia 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
(HCI3, 2014) (NCQA, 2015a) 
From those states, I focused on Maryland and Wisconsin. Maryland offers a Patient 
Guide, designed to help patients compare hospitals based on quality. Wisconsin’s healthcare 
quality website has been offering comparison information to consumers since 2005. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Criteria for quality transparency case evaluation  
 Criteria State(s) meeting the criteria 
1. User-friendliness of quality Is quality information Maryland 
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measures specific enough for 
consumers to infer how 
safe their own treatment 
will be, by providing: 
(c) Multiple metrics for 
different measures, 
such as hospital-
acquired infections 
in addition to 
readmission rates? 
(d)  Procedure-specific 
in addition to or 
instead of overall 
hospital data? 
2. User-friendliness of 
website 
Does the website tailor 
information to the 
consumer’s specific needs 
through interactivity by: 
(c) Allowing 
comparison of 
specific hospitals? 
(d) Allowing searching 
by condition or 
treatment? 
Maryland 
3. Completeness of 
information 
Is information available: 
(e) On any given 
procedure? 
(f) On all relevant 
providers? 
(g) For all recent years? 
Maryland 
4. Estimated website traffic If available, does it indicate 
significant usage? 
 
(HCI3, 2014) (NCQA, 2015a) 
 
4.4.1 Maryland 
 
Maryland offers a Patient Guide, designed to help patients compare hospitals based 
on quality. The website provides information designed to help patients select a hospital that 
provides a high level of care for a given medical condition, and understand how often 
hospitals perform recommended treatments for selected medical conditions (Guide, 2012). 
User-friendliness of Maryland’s quality measures and website 
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The Maryland Hospital Association website allows patients to sort by condition and 
see how each hospital performs on multiple sets of quality measures for that condition.  
 
Figure 12: Maryland Health Care Quality Reports (screenshot) 
 
Completeness of information on Maryland’s website 
The Maryland Hospital Performance Evaluation Guide contains information from 
several sources (Guide, 2012). Information on the number of patients treated for a medical 
condition, how long they stayed in the hospital, and how many of them were readmitted to 
the hospital for the same condition comes from the Maryland Health Services Cost Review 
Commission (HSCRC) and from Washington, D.C. hospitals. 
Another source of information included is hospital profile information, such as 
licensed bed counts and neonatal intensive care unit levels, which comes from the Maryland 
Health Care Commission (MHCC). Also included is information on quality measures and 
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services offered directly from the hospitals, as well as information on patient readmissions 
and transfers from Maryland hospitals to healthcare facilities in the District of Columbia, 
which comes from Washington, D.C. hospitals. 
These performance measures have developed over time, developing from listing only 
Heart Attack, Heart Failure, Pneumonia, and Surgical Infection Prevention in June 2007 to 
listing Heart Attack, Heart Failure, Pneumonia, Surgical Care, Patient Satisfaction, Children’s 
Asthma, Medical Imaging, Emergency Department Care, Preventative Care, Healthcare 
Associated Infections, Stroke Care, Blood Clot Prevention, and 30-Day Outcomes as of 
January 2015. 
Figure 13: Maryland Health Care Quality Reports: Summary of Hospital Information 
(screenshot) 
 
 
4.4.2 Wisconsin 
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Wisconsin’s healthcare quality website has been offering comparison information to 
consumers since 2005. In 2004, through the support of WEA Trust, WCHQ released an 
interactive Performance & Progress Report. This web-based report allows any individual to 
access relevant, audited healthcare quality information, while comparing a choice of 
healthcare providers and performance measures.  
 
User-friendliness of Wisconsin’s quality measures 
Wisconsin’s quality measures are not user-friendly. While WCHQ provides multiple 
metrics for different measures, such as hospital-acquired infections in addition to 
readmission rates, and it does provide procedure-specific data, it presents these metrics in 
ways that are not accessible to the average consumer. For example, see Figure 14, which has 
all the important information there for someone to know how statistically rigorous the data 
is—but does not do enough work for the consumer to help her draw conclusions about 
what this means for her own treatment.  
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Figure 14: WCHQ CABG deep sternal wound infection (screenshot) 
 
User-friendliness of Wisconsin’s website 
To some degree, the website tailors information to the consumer’s specific needs 
through interactivity. It allows comparison of specific hospitals, and allows searching by 
some categories of treatment. But as Figure 9 shows, the results cater too much to a 
statistician and not enough to a woman who is just trying to figure out where to go for her 
mammogram. 
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Figure 15: WCHQ breast cancer screening (screenshot) 
 
 
Completeness of information on Wisconsin’s website 
Although information is available for certain procedures, providers, and years, it was 
very difficult to find any data on certain hospitals and conditions. For example, if I want to 
know which hospital will be best for my kidney disease management, the results from 
WCHQ presented in Figure 10 will be very little help. 
 
Figure 16: WCHQ Measures Summary (screenshot) 
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4.5 Private initiatives for quality transparency 
 
Private initiatives for quality transparency include the U.S. News and World Report 
rankings of hospitals, which are available on the website and in print. Another is by the Joint 
Commission, a national nonprofit that administers the website qualitycheck.org. Another is 
the Leapfrog Group, a national organization that makes hospital quality measures available 
on leapfroggroup.org. Further private initiatives include Healthgrades, a national 
organization that produces healthgrades.com, and the Michigan Hospital Association 
Keystone Center, which also administers a website.  
Major hospital quality reporting organizations include the Consumer Assessment of 
Health Professionals and Systems; The Joint Commission; The National Quality Forum; 
National Quality Measures Clearinghouse; Aligning Forces for Quality; and 
CalQualityCare.org (run by the California Healthcare Foundation). In December 2003, the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) released the first NHQR, which 
included quality measures for the nation (C. o. t. F. o. R. H. Care, 2005). In 2006, AHRQ 
released a web-based tool called State Snapshots (NCQA, 2007). State Snapshots ranked 
each state on 15 measures of healthcare quality and showed each state’s relative performance 
(NCQA, 2007). 
In June 2001, the Leapfrog Group began requesting information from hospitals on 
three safety practices (use of computerized physician order entry, evidence-based hospital 
referral, and staffing of intensive care units with doctors who have specialized critical care 
training), then in April 2004 added thirty safe practices identified by the National Quality 
Forum (C. o. t. F. o. R. H. Care, 2005). 
4.5.1 CalQualityCare 
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CalQualityCare is managed by the California HealthCare Foundation (CHCF), a 
nonprofit group dedicated to improving the value of healthcare in California (Foundation, 
2015). CHCF has multiple partners to provide the information on the website, namely the 
California Hospitals Assessment and Reporting Taskforce,30 California Healthcare 
Performance Information System,31 Consumer Reports Health,32 Truven Health Analytics,33 
and the Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences at the University of California, San 
Francisco. In 2002, CHCF began publishing online ratings of nursing homes; in 2004, it 
added similar ratings of home health care agencies and hospice services; then, in 2005, it 
incorporated congregate living health facilities, assisted living, continuing care retirement 
communities, adult healthcare programs, and adult day care centers. In 2007, CHCF began 
aggregating data from voluntarily participating hospitals and insurers  
 
 
User-friendliness of CalQualityCare’s quality measures 
The quality information on CalQualityCare is specific enough for consumers to infer 
how safe their own treatment will be. It provides multiple metrics for different measures, 
such as hospital-acquired infections in addition to readmission rates. It also provides 
procedure-specific in addition to or instead of overall hospital data (Foundation, 2015). The 
conditions and procedures rated are among the most common reasons for being admitted to 
a hospital (Foundation, 2015). 
                                            
30 The California Hospital Assessment and Reporting Task Force has received in-kind and financial support 
from over 200 California hospitals, the California Health Care Foundation, and every California health plan 
with at least 3% market share (Dudley, 2015).  
31 The California Healthcare Performance Information System (CHPI) is a 501(c)(4) nonprofit, public benefit 
corporation. CHPI is building a healthcare database with the healthcare experiences of more than 12 million 
people from health plans and Medicare to evaluate the quality and efficiency of medical services (CHPI, 2015). 
32 Consumer Reports is a nonprofit organization that works toward a “fair, just, and safe marketplace for all 
consumers” (Reports, 2015). 
33 Truven Health Analytics contracts with hospitals, physicians, pharmacists, employers, health plans, 
government agencies, pharmaceutical companies, researchers, and policymakers to provide healthcare data and 
analytics (Truven, 2015). 
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The quality measures depend on which federal or state agency the data comes from. 
From CMS Hospital Compare comes data on patient experience, patient safety, heart attack, 
heart failure, lung conditions and pneumonia, and emergency department care (Foundation, 
2015). From California CABG Outcomes Reporting Program and California OSHPD comes 
heart bypass surgery (Foundation, 2015). From the California OSHPD also comes surgeries 
and other conditions. From the California Department of Public Health comes the 
breastfeeding rate (Foundation, 2015). From the California Maternal Quality Care 
Collaborative come all other mother and baby measures (Foundation, 2015). 
 
User-friendliness of CalQualityCare’s website 
CalQualityCare tailors information to the consumer’s specific needs through 
interactivity. It allows comparison of specific hospitals. To some degree, it allows searching 
by condition or treatment, but in a very limited way: heart attack, heart bypass surgery, heart 
failure, mother and baby, and lung conditions are the only possibilities (Foundation, 2015). 
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Figure 17: CalQualityCare (screenshot) 
 
Completeness of information on CalQualityCare’s website 
CalQualityCare does not have information on all procedures, nor on all providers, 
nor for all recent years. It includes hospital measures for clinical care, patient safety, and 
patient experience for all acute care hospitals in the state of California with publicly available 
information (Foundation, 2015). This represents 332 hospitals, and does not include 
psychiatric hospitals, rehabilitation facilities, long-term acute care hospitals and specialty only 
hospitals (Foundation, 2015). Some small, rural, or Critical Access Hospitals do not have 
publically available data or a sufficient amount of data to score them accurately (Foundation, 
2015). Measures of children’s health care are not included nor widely available (Foundation, 
2015). 
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4.6 Chapter conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the current state of affairs for quality transparency in the 
U.S. hospital market, showing the degree of variability between initiatives. It bears clarifying 
that a hospital can have a high mortality rate for a procedure and still provide high quality 
care—a hospital could be very good and as a result get the hardest cases. For this reason, 
predicting the behavior of healthcare market participants according to bounded rationality is 
particularly important, as not all consumers will understand the implications of mortality 
ratings for their own circumstances. 
While this chapter’s discussion showed the importance of different quality measures 
in providing an accurate picture of how good a hospital is, Chapter 5 will delve into the 
difference between perceived and actual quality.   
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Chapter 5 Findings and analysis 
 
 
A 2015 New York Times article34 features Harvard’s Beth Israel Deaconess Medical 
Center in Boston,35 Yale-New Haven Hospital,36 the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research 
Center in Seattle,37 University of Utah hospital,38 and Stanford Health Care.39 The article cites 
examples of patient surveys triggering hospital improvements, especially relating to process. 
For instance, one survey revealed that patients felt unable to get a good night’s sleep without 
interruption, so Dr. Michael Bennick (medical director for patient experience at Yale-New 
Haven Hospital) required any 4 a.m.-blood draw to be accompanied by a phone call to him. 
Middle-of-the-night blood draws stopped. 
*** 
                                            
34 “Doctors strive to do less harm by inattentive care,” reads a New York Times headline from February 18, 
2015. 
35 Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center appeared on 84 U.S. News and World Report “Best Hospital” lists 
between 2001 and 2014, for its performance in various specialties including: oncology, gastroenterology, 
geriatrics, gynecology, cardiology, endocrinology, nephrology, orthopedics, and rheumatology (USNWR et al., 
2015).  
36 Yale-New Haven Hospital appeared on 150 U.S. News and World Report “Best Hospital” lists between 2001 
and 2014, for its performance in various specialties including: oncology, gastroenterology, ear nose and throat, 
geriatrics, gynecology, cardiology, endocrinology, nephrology, orthopedics, urology, and rheumatology 
(USNWR et al., 2015). 
37 The Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center did not appear on any U.S. News and World Report “Best 
Hospital” lists between 2001 and 2014 (USNWR et al., 2015). 
38 The University of Utah Hospital appeared on 18 U.S. News and World Report “Best Hospital” lists between 
2002 and 2014, for its performance in various specialties including: oncology, gynecology, and orthopedics 
(USNWR et al., 2015). 
39 Stanford Health Care appeared on 181 U.S. News and World Report “Best Hospital” lists between 2001 and 
2014, for its performance in various specialties including: oncology, gastroenterology, geriatrics, gynecology, 
cardiology, endocrinology, nephrology, orthopedics, and rheumatology (USNWR et al., 2015). 
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Chapters 3 and 4 discussed implementation of price and quality transparency. In 
Chapter 5, I shift focus to connect price and quality transparency implementation to its 
efficacy. Patient surveys, which have been rolled out nationwide by the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, prompt both supply-side and demand-side change. They promote 
supply-side change by motivating hospitals to change their internal policies. They facilitate 
demand-side change by enabling consumers to make decisions about which hospital to select 
based on survey results about it.  
In this chapter, I juxtapose the longstanding and widespread perspective that 
transparency ought to be promoted with the reality that transparency is very difficult to do 
right. President Bush’s healthcare policies are emblematic of the view that healthcare in 
transparency is good because it makes intuitive sense. On August 22, 2006, President Bush 
signed an Executive Order to increase the transparency of the healthcare system in the U.S. 
(House, 2006). The Executive Order directed federal agencies that administered or 
sponsored federal health insurance programs to increase transparency in pricing, increase 
transparency in quality, encourage adoption of health information technology standards, and 
provide options that promote quality and efficiency in healthcare (House, 2006). The 
Executive Order stipulated that, “To spend their healthcare dollars wisely, Americans need 
to know their options in advance, know the quality of doctors and hospitals in their area, and 
know what procedures will cost. When Americans buy new cars, they have access to 
consumer research on safety, reliability, price, and performance—and they should be able to 
expect the same when they purchase healthcare” (NCQA, 2007).  
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The reality of implementation did not live up to Bush’s vision in the Executive 
Order. In 2007, four federal agencies40 published the “Progress Report on Implementation 
of Executive Order 13410 ‘Promoting Quality and Efficient Health Care in Federal 
Government Administered or Sponsored Health Care Programs’” (Services et al., 2007). The 
Progress Report highlighted certain steps taken, including CMS adding two mortality 
measures for heart attack and heart failure to Hospital Compare in June 2007, OPM 
contracting with Web-MD to conduct a pilot project (deployed prior to November 2007) 
with three Federal agencies in the DC area to determine how employees use provider price 
and quality information, and the VA adopting a set of standards from the Ambulatory Care 
Quality Alliance (AQA) and coordinating the testing of the quality standards with the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and Indian Health Services (IHS). 
Yet, the U.S. has not done much in the eight years following President Bush’s 
Executive Order. The previous chapter presented the current state of affairs for price and 
quality transparency in the U.S. hospital market, and showed that the developments have 
been relatively recent. This chapter analyzes the usefulness of current information available 
to consumers, demonstrating that recent reforms have not gone far enough to prompt the 
demand-driven improvements in healthcare delivery they sought to achieve.  
                                            
40 The agencies that published the progress report were the Department of Health and Human Services, the 
U.S. Office of Personnel Management, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(Services, Management, Defense, & Affairs, 2007). From the Department of Health and Human Services were 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Office of the National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology (ONC), the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), and the Indian 
Health Services (IHS) (Services et al., 2007). 
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Price and quality transparency can only facilitate change insofar as healthcare 
consumers effectively use the information it makes available. Yet, federal, state, and private 
websites provide information on hospital price and quality in different ways, including 
different measures of each. These discrepancies may lead consumers to make suboptimal 
decisions. 
Therefore, I designed and administered surveys to quantify the extent to which 
discrepancies between websites impact consumer decisions. Four surveys were administered 
in total. Each survey had a section on price and one on quality. The survey respondents were 
choosing between two hospitals with obvious differences for utility maximization. 
Specifically, when deciding on the basis of price, the least expensive hospital, ceteris paribus, 
would maximize utility. Likewise, the highest quality hospital was assumed to maximize 
utility. 
Survey 1, which had versions (a) and (b), explored how consumers make healthcare 
decisions based on available information as it is currently presented to the public. This was 
achieved by taking screenshots of the information on two hospitals from two different 
hospital price and quality websites.41,42 Including screenshots of websites was intended to 
simulate the process by which consumers would access information on their own when 
preparing to make a real life healthcare decision. Beyond conveying the price information 
                                            
41 For price, one of the websites searched was OpsCost, a privately run website that makes public data more 
accessible and helps individuals share their healthcare bills. The other website searched was My Health Care 
Options, which is administered by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
42 For quality, one of the websites searched was U.S. News Best Hospitals, a privately run website that releases 
rankings every year by specialty. The other website searched was Medicare Hospital Compare, which is 
administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
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itself, using screenshots retained the visual presentation of information of each website and 
the amount of information presented. In contrast, survey 2, which had versions (a) and (b), 
extracted price and quality information from the same websites and presented it in table 
form. Survey 2 sought to isolate the effect of the information itself from its presentation. 
In section 5.1, I discuss the usefulness of price information currently available to the 
public; section 5.2 focuses on quality information. In section 5.2, I present findings from the 
U.S. News Best Hospital rankings for the years 2001 through 2014. In both sections, I 
present survey results that show consumers having varying degrees of difficulty in choosing 
the higher quality or lower cost option. The key finding from the surveys was that people are 
significantly more likely to make the right choice if they are not told where data comes from, 
and if information overload is reduced by non-graphical image presentation. 
 
5.1 Usefulness of price-paid information currently available to the public 
 
The usefulness of price-paid information to consumers depends on a few factors, 
including (1) the consumer’s desire for price information, and (2) the information presented 
alongside price-paid information. Price transparency matters more to some consumers than 
to others. Those with especially strong incentives to choose lower-priced healthcare include 
those who are directly responsible for payment, such as the uninsured or those on high-
deductible plans (Delbanco, 2014). There is a common misperception that a provider that 
costs more administers better quality, leading consumers to gravitate toward high cost 
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providers (Delbanco, 2014). As a result, it can be useful to present quality and price 
information together, to paint a picture of the value of care given by a provider. Certain 
desired features for the display of price and quality indicators include simple language, 
contextual information (such as “below average”), and limited information presented initially 
(with drill-downs possible) to prevent cognitive overload (Delbanco, 2014). 
5.1.1 Survey: price transparency 
The driving question of this thesis is: to what extent can and should patients in the 
US use price and quality information to choose hospitals in order to improve healthcare 
value in the market? Thus far, I have written about and evaluated efforts to promote 
transparency. But it is also necessary to ground my analysis of these current efforts in a 
broader assessment of how people currently make and would make healthcare decisions, 
given materials presently available. As a result, I developed and administered two survey 
experiments to determine the impact of information provided and the presentation of that 
information on enabling better decision-making. In this section, I present the sections of the 
surveys that pertain to price transparency. Section 5.2.2 presents those for quality 
transparency. 
What is meant by good decision-making here comes from Chapter 2, which argued 
that healthcare consumers are best understood through the lens of bounded rationality. 
Decision-making in this context is good insofar as means that higher quality and lower cost 
healthcare is consumed.  
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Therefore, the first survey addressed the ability of everyday consumers to make 
healthcare decisions based on currently available information as it is presented to the public. 
This was achieved by taking screenshots of the information on two hospitals from two 
different hospital price websites. The two hospitals were Beth Israel Deaconess Medical 
Center and Massachusetts General Hospital, both located in Boston. The hospitals were 
chosen partly because of the existence of the Massachusetts My Health Care Options, which 
provides hospital price and quality data. They were also chosen because they are in close 
proximity to each other, which should reduce the effect of distance on the consumer 
decision. Finally, both hospitals appeared frequently on the U.S. News Best Hospital list, so 
it was hoped that any name-based reputational effects would be diminished. 
The first survey consisted of versions 1(a) and 1(b) to allow comparison of consumer 
decisions when presented with different websites providing information on the same 
hospitals. Survey 1(a) used screenshots of My Health Care Options, which is administered by 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Survey 1(b) presented screenshots of OpsCost, a 
privately run website that makes public data more accessible and helps individuals share their 
healthcare bills.  
Table 1 provides a summary of both surveys and their versions. The results of 
Survey 1 showed that everyday consumers had difficulty making optimal healthcare decisions 
based on available information as it is currently presented to the public. The results of 
Survey 2 showed that the metrics chosen to present healthcare pricing information lead 
consumers to different, sometimes suboptimal, decisions. The first survey was administered 
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February 17 through February 22nd, 2015, and paid respondents $0.04 per survey. The 
second survey was administered from March 18 through March 22, 2015, and paid 
respondents $0.10 per survey. Because the second survey was administered after the first 
survey, it also refined some of the preliminary questions based on how well they elicited 
answers in the first survey. For all the survey questions, Survey 2(a) can be found in full in 
the Appendix. 
 
Figure 18: Summary of surveys 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), and 2(b) for price transparency 
 
 
Respondents were provided with some background information on the website, as 
demonstrated in Figure 1. For example, as shown in Figure 1, Survey 1(a) described My 
Health Care Options as a website run by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Health Care 
Quality and Cost Council.  
Information 
presentation
Internet source of  
price information
Hospitals shown
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center
Massachusetts General Hospital
My Health Care 
Options 
(Massachusetts)
Survey 1(a) 
Screenshots 
of website
Survey 2(a)
Tables
OpsCost
Survey 1(a) 
Screenshots 
of website
Survey 2(a)
Tables
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Figure 19: Excerpt from Survey 1(a): Price information from My Health Care Options 
(screenshot) 
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Survey 1(b) included the same instructions as Survey 1(a), but presented information 
from OpsCost instead of from My Health Care Options, as depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 20: Excerpt from Survey 1(b): Price information from OpsCost (screenshot) 
 
 
As is clear from both figures, there are multiple ways to provide context about price 
information. OpsCost allows the consumer to compare prices among nearby hospitals, while 
My Health Care Options does the comparison on a more aggregate level for the consumer 
(“Not Different from Median State Cost”). But it is also clear from the figures that the same 
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information can be presented in different ways, which may have implications for consumer 
decisions. 
As a result, the second survey decoupled website information from its presentation. 
The aim of the second survey was to show that healthcare pricing information, with sources 
choosing different metrics, could be complicated and sometimes misleading. This could lead 
consumers to make suboptimal decisions, independent of differences in presentation.   
Survey versions 2(a) and 2(b) extracted price information respectively from My 
Health Care Options and OpsCost and presented it in table form. The second survey 
anonymized the websites, terming My Health Care Compare “a state-run website” and 
OpsCost “a privately-run website.” In Survey 2, the hospitals, too, are anonymized to 
eliminate reputational effects, as shown in Figure 3.  
 
 Figure 21: Excerpt from Survey 2(a): Price information from My Health Care Options 
(extracted) 
The hospitals were referred to as “Hospital A” and  “Hospital B,” but had almost 
the exact same information as th
from My Health Care Options, depicted in Figure 3. 
adjusted slightly for Survey 2(b)
provides both billed and reimbursed amounts for a procedure. Massachusetts General 
Hospital was more expensive for the billed amount, but Beth Israel Deaconess Medical 
Center was more expensive for the reimbursed amount. Survey 2 removes the ambiguity 
resulting from this by making “Hospital B” (Massachusetts General Hospital) more 
expensive for both billed and reimbursed amount, as shown in Figure 4.
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e real hospitals. No numbers were altered for the price data 
However, the price information was 
 to make the better choice more clear. Specifically, OpsCost
  
 
 
 Figure 22: Excerpt from Survey 2(b): Price information from OpsCost (extracted)
The surveys were built in Qualtrics, 
creation. The surveys were administered through 
short), an online labor market where requesters post jobs and workers choose which jobs
do for pay (Amazon, 2015). Numerous studies have shown correspondence between the 
behavior of workers on Mechanical Turk and behavior offline,
means of gathering respondents for this small
As Table 2 shows, 224 respondents w
respondents, while Survey 2 had 102 respondents.
young (the median age was 30
bachelors degree), making ends meet (
settling down (50 percent were married
                                           
43 Mason and Suri (2011) compare the beha
subjects, showing that the norm on Mechanical Turk of paying less than one would typically pay laboratory 
subjects should not impact large classes of experiments 
highlight three benefits of using Mechanical Turk to run online experiments: (1) subject pool access, (2) subject 
pool diversity, and (3) low cost (Mason & Suri, 2011
differences between the results from Mechanical Turk and s
Midwestern university (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010
respondents are often more representative of the U.S. population than in
representative than subjects in Internet
2012). Buhrmester et al. (2011) show that for tasks that rely on subjective responses (as is the case with my 
surveys), there is no relationship between pay rates and the quality of data gleaned from MTurk 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). 
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which is web-based software that enables survey 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk for 
43 which makes it a suitable 
-scale survey. 
ere surveyed total. Survey 1 had 122 
 Across both surveys, respondents were 
), educated (the average highest education level achieved was a 
the average household income was $40,000
), religious (a plurality of respondents practice 
 
vior of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers to that of laboratory 
(Mason & Suri, 2011). Mason and Suri (2011) also 
). Paolacci and Chandler (2010) found only slight 
ubjects recruited from the subject pool at a large 
). Berinsky et al. (2012) show that MTurk 
-person convenience samples, but less 
-based panels or national probability samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 
 
 
 to 
-$49,999), 
(Buhrmester, 
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Christianity), and leaning toward the left (a plurality were Democrats). On average, it took 
six minutes to respond to the surveys. 
 
Table 6: Participant information across Surveys 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), and 2(b)  
 N 224 
Gender Female 51% 
Male  49% 
Age Age (mean) 34 years  
Age (median) 30 years  
Education Highest achieved education level (mean) Bachelors degree 
Financial security Annual household income (mean) $40,000-$49,999 
Covered by health insurance 82% 
Relationship status Single 40% 
Married 50% 
Religion Practices Christianity 37% 
Practices Hinduism 27% 
Political affiliation Republican 24% 
Democrat 38% 
Independent 31% 
Other 6% 
Familiarity with 
process and 
subject matter 
Ever used online reviews to decide 
whether to purchase something (e.g., 
Amazon reviews for a cell phone) 
91% 
Ever used online reviews of a hospital to 
decide where to receive care 
38% 
Ever researched prices to decide where 
to receive medical care 
51% 
Immediate family member/close friend 
employed in healthcare 
51% 
Mean perceived comfort navigating the 
healthcare system (scale of 1 to 100, with 
100 = perfect comfort) 
67/100 
Saw a doctor in the past year 84% 
Familiarity with 
existing resources 
Hospital Compare 28% 
Leapfrog Group 17% 
U.S. News Best Hospitals 56% 
Patient Guide (Maryland) 20% 
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My Health Care Options (Massachusetts) 16% 
Wisconsin Collaborative for Healthcare 
Quality 
16% 
The Joint Commission 26% 
Healthgrades 35% 
Michigan Hospital Association Keystone 
Center 
23% 
Hospital Provider Charge and Actual 
Payment Data (Medicare) 
22% 
Colorado All-Payer Claims Database 15% 
New Hampshire Health Cost 17% 
Montana Hospital Association 
PricePoint 
19% 
Oregon Association of Hospitals and 
Health Systems PricePoint 
18% 
Survey logistics Time to complete survey (mean) 6 minutes 
 
Price transparency survey: Do respondents choose the less expensive option? 
 
For Survey 1(a), 55 respondents made decisions based on price information on Beth 
Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Massachusetts General Hospital. They were shown 
price information from My Health Care Options, the Massachusetts-run website. The 
cheaper choice was Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. Respondents were asked to 
assume that the hospitals were of equal quality. 
In response to Survey 1(a), a majority of respondents selected the cheapest choice, 
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (39 respondents, constituting 70.91% of the sample). 
A single sample two-tailed t-test was performed on Survey 1(a) to determine whether this 
figure was statistically significant. The percentage of respondents choosing the cheapest 
hospital was determined to be statistically significant at a confidence level of 99% (t = 
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3.3813, p = 0.0014). More people selected Beth Israel Deaconess than the null hypothesis of 
an even distribution could accommodate. 
For Survey 1(b), 53 respondents were presented with price information on Beth 
Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Massachusetts General Hospital through OpsCost. 
The cheapest choice at first appeared unclear. Massachusetts General Hospital was more 
expensive for the billed amount, but Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center was more 
expensive for the reimbursed amount. Yet, respondents were instructed to assume that they 
would be paying out of pocket for their care, so they ought to have made their decision on 
the basis of the billed amount. The cheapest decision would be to attend Beth Israel 
Deaconess. Instead, there was evident confusion: one respondent selected Massachusetts 
General because “Massachusetts General is world renowned”; another noted, “I would want 
to know what Mass Gen patients are getting for the extra $$$ (more luxury?).” As a result, 
the instructions of the parameters for the decision were made more explicit for Survey 2 (see 
Figure 22). 
In response to Survey 1(b), a majority of respondents selected the cheapest option, 
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (31 respondents, constituting 58.49% of the sample). 
A single sample two-tailed t-test was performed on Survey 1(b) to determine whether this 
figure was statistically significant. The percentage of respondents choosing the cheapest 
hospital was not statistically significant at a confidence level of 95% (t = 1.2438, p = 0.2192). 
An assumption of even distribution could accommodate the number of people that selected 
the cheapest option. 
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Analysis of the survey results focused on whether respondents selected the hospital 
with the lowest price. As we can see in Table 7, the information presented in Survey 1(a) was 
only slightly better than Survey 1(b) at leading consumers to choose Beth Israel Deaconess. 
The difference was not large enough to be statistically significant at p < .05 (t = 1.3499, p = 
.1799).  
 
Table 7: Surveys 1(a) and 1(b) for price: Results of two-tailed Student t-test  
 1(a) 1(b) Difference 
Cheapest choice 39 (71%) 31 (58%) 8 (13%)† 
N  55 53 
† nonsignificant at the 0.05 probability level. 
 
 
Now let us move on to Survey 2. For Survey 2(a), 52 respondents made decisions 
based on price information on Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Massachusetts 
General Hospital. They were shown price information extracted from My Health Care 
Options, the Massachusetts-run website, and presented in table format (see Figure 3). The 
better choice was Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, because it was shown to be lower 
cost than Massachusetts General. Respondents were asked to assume that the hospitals were 
of equal quality. 
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In response to Survey 2(a), a majority of respondents selected the cheapest option, 
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, disguised as Hospital A (48 respondents, constituting 
92.31% of the sample). A single sample two-tailed t-test was performed on Survey 2(a) to 
determine whether this figure was statistically significant. The percentage of respondents 
choosing the cheapest hospital was statistically significant at a confidence level of 99.99% (t 
= 11.3352, p < .00001). An assumption of even distribution could not accommodate the 
number of people that selected the cheapest option. 
For Survey 2(b), 50 respondents were presented with price information on Beth 
Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Massachusetts General Hospital extracted from 
OpsCost. The cheaper choice was made especially clear through the fudging of numbers, 
which made Massachusetts General Hospital appear more expensive for both the billed and 
reimbursed amounts.  
In response to Survey 2(b), a majority of respondents selected the cheapest option, 
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, disguised as Hospital A (44 respondents, constituting 
88.00% of the sample). A single sample two-tailed t-test was performed on Survey 2(b) to 
determine whether this figure was statistically significant. The percentage of respondents 
choosing the cheapest hospital was statistically significant at a confidence level of 99.99% (t 
= 8.1846, p < .00001). An assumption of even distribution could not accommodate the 
number of people that selected the cheapest option. 
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Table 8: Surveys 2(a) and 2(b) for price: Results of two-tailed Student t-test  
 2(a) 2(b) Difference 
Cheapest choice 48 (92%) 44 (88%) 4 (4%)† 
N  52 50 
† Nonsignificant at the 0.05 probability level. 
 
As we can see in Table 8, the materials in Survey 2(a) were only slightly better than 
those in Survey 2(b) at leading consumers to choose Beth Israel Deaconess. The difference 
was not large enough to be statistically significant (t = 0.7261, p = .4695).  
 
 
Table 9: Surveys 1 and 2 for price: Results of two-tailed Student t-test  
 1(a&b) 2(a&b) Difference 
Cheapest choice 73 (65%) 92 (90%) 19 (25%)*** 
N  108 102 
***p < .001 
 
As shown in Table 9, respondents to Survey 2 outperformed Survey 1 by a 
statistically significant amount. The relative performance of respondents to Survey 1 and 
Survey 2 shows that consumers are significantly more likely to make the better decision 
when relevant information is presented in straightforward ways (t = 4.5705; p < 0.00001).  
 
Price transparency survey: Who was more likely to choose the less expensive option? 
 
Analysis of the survey results first focused on whether respondents selected the 
hospital with the lowest price. Secondary analysis showed that propensity to make the 
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optimal decision was not predicted by any particular factors, as collected by demographic 
and other informational questions in the surveys. 
Examining political affiliation across all surveys, one sees that Republicans were no 
more likely than those of any other political affiliation to choose the cheapest option at a 
confidence level of 95% (t = -0.1294; p = 0.5). Of respondents, 76.47% of Republicans (n = 
51) and 77.36% of non-Republicans (n = 159) selected the cheapest option.  
Examining gender across all surveys, women were no more likely than men to 
choose the cheapest option at a confidence level of 95% (t = 1.9418; p = 0.5). 82.57% of 
female respondents (n = 109) and 71.29% of male respondents (n = 101) selected the 
cheapest option. (For gender, none of the respondents to the surveys identified as “other.”)  
For education, those with graduate degrees (JD, MBA, MPH, Ph.D., or other) were 
no more likely than those without to choose the cheapest option at a confidence level of 
95% (t = -0.8429; p = 0.5). Across all of the surveys, 72.34% of those with graduate degrees 
(n = 47) and 78.53% of those without graduate degrees (n = 163) selected the cheapest 
option.  
Those with higher household incomes were statistically no more likely than those 
without to choose the cheapest option at a confidence level of 95% (t = 2.5042; p = 0.5). 
Across all of the surveys, 87.10% of those with annual household incomes equal to or 
greater than $60,000 (n = 62) and 72.97% of those with annual household incomes less than 
$60,000 (n = 148) selected the cheapest option.  
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Those employed in healthcare were not statistically more likely to choose the 
cheapest option at a confidence level of 95% for a single-tailed t-test (t = 0.9183; p = 
0.1847). Specifically, those employed in healthcare were considered to be those with 
occupations listed as: health diagnosis or treating practitioners and technical occupations; 
health care support; and health technologists or technicians. Across all of the surveys, 
86.67% of those employed in healthcare (n = 15) and 76.41% of those not employed in 
healthcare (n = 195) selected the cheaper option.  
Those with family or friends employed in healthcare were not statistically more likely 
to choose the cheapest option at a confidence level of 95% (t = -2.6594; p = 0.5). Across all 
of the surveys, 69.52% of those with family or close friends employed in healthcare (n = 
105) and 84.76% of those without (n = 105) selected the cheaper option. (Respondents who 
declined to answer the question about having a family member or close friend employed in 
healthcare were counted as not having close friends or family members employed in 
healthcare.) 
In this section, I have presented the results of the survey pertaining to price 
transparency. Recent reforms produced information that is useful to consumers, but has not 
required the presentation of that information in ways that would facilitate demand-driven 
improvements. In the next section, I show that the same holds true for quality transparency.  
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5.2 Usefulness of quality information currently available to the public 
 
In this section, I evaluate the usefulness of quality information currently available to 
the public. I focus on two websites in particular: U.S. News Best Hospitals and Medicare 
Hospital Compare. These websites cater to consumers in fundamentally different ways. U.S. 
News Best Hospitals tries to make decisions for the consumers. It allows regional searching 
by treatment type, and the results show up in rank order, best to worst. In contrast, Hospital 
Compare tries not to pick favorites: it allows for regional searching, but not by treatment 
type, and provides results in alphabetical order. It also has a direct compare feature, 
encouraging consumers to actively make decisions. 
5.2.1 U.S. News and World Report rankings, 2001-2014 
Any discussion of quality transparency would be remiss without analysis of the U.S. 
News and World Report rankings. The U.S. News Best Hospitals are a good proxy for 
information regarding quality that is available to the consumer. They are available online for 
free, and are used frequently in hospital advertisements. The survey showed that 56 percent 
of respondents were familiar with the rankings.  
Analysis of the rankings reveals significant differences between hospitals that are 
ranked by U.S. News and World Report and those that are not. Ranked hospitals are more 
likely to be found in wealthy, highly populated areas, with a high percentage of health 
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insurance coverage. Ranked hospitals are less likely to be the sole community provider, are 
more likely to be affiliated with a medical school, and see more patients every day. 
In terms of methodology, to perform this analysis, data was merged onto the U.S. 
News-ranked hospitals dataset from the census and from the American Hospital 
Association. AHA data was available for 2000-2011, and was merged on via encoded 
hospital identifiers. The census data came in two datasets—SAHIE, with population 
insurance estimates, and SAIPE, with income and poverty estimates—and was available for 
2008 through 2011. Both datasets were merged using FIPS codes. Despite the year 
limitations for the census data, the hospitals marked as “ranked” by U.S. News in that 
dataset were ranked at any point between 2001 and 2014. The full list was retained because 
so few hospitals are ranked each year, and wanted to determine more about the types of 
hospitals that get onto the U.S. News Best Hospital list, not just which hospitals were on the 
list for which particular years. The comparison of U.S. News-ranked hospitals and Medicare 
Hospital Compare was limited to the year 2011. The non-encrypted U.S. News data was 
used, and Hospital Compare 2011 readmissions and mortality index was compressed, to 
average score. Any average score of “better than national average” coming from the 6 
measures was counted. The data was matched by STATA and then by hand.  
To determine the volatility of the U.S. News rankings, a variable that marked the first 
time each hospital appeared on the list, and then each time it reappeared on the list after 
dropping off. Each hospital had a listing per year, which either said “listed” or “not”, and 
counted the number of times listed per year (i.e., if appearing on lists for both cardiology and 
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gastroenterology, had a count of 2 for that hospital for that year). This showed that it is 
easier to leave the list than to get on (or back on) it. However, there were years with 
incomplete information—2011 and 2013—and pediatrics stopped being included and 
became its own separate ranking after 2001, but hospitals ranked on the separate pediatrics 
list are not included. 
 
Table 10: U.S. News-ranked hospitals by year, with inflow and outflow to show 
volatility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** p < .001  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hospitals 
ranked by 
U.S. 
News 
Entering 
the list (% 
of ranked 
hospitals) 
Leaving 
the list (% 
of ranked 
hospitals) Difference  
Total 
hospitals 
unranked 
by U.S. 
News 
2001  167 - 23 (13.77%) - 5,521 
2002 189 58 (30.69%) 23 (12.17%) 35 (18.52%) 5,542 
2003 186 30 (16.13%) 24 (12.90%) 6 (3.23%) 5,570 
2004 159 13 (8.18%) 13 (8.18%) 0 (0%) 5,699 
2005 159 13 (8.18%) 13 (8.18%) 0 (0%) 5,980 
2006 159 14 (8.81%) 26 (16.35%) 12 (7.54%) 6,016 
2007 170 28 (16.47%) 19 (11.18%) 9 (5.29%) 6,002 
2008 166 6 (3.61%) 28 (16.87%) 22 (13.26%) 6,115 
2009 158 17 (10.76%) 36 (22.78%) 19 (12.02%) 6,082 
2010 155 11 (7.01%) 33 (21.29%) 22 (14.28%) 6,100 
2011 128 0 (0.00%) - - 6,121 
Mean N 149.67 19 (10.98%) 23.8 
(14.37%) 
4.8 
(3.38%)*** 
5,886 
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Table 11: Populations served by U.S. News ranked and unranked hospitals, 2008-
2011: Results of two-sample t-test with unequal variances  
 
*** p < .001 
 
The trend in Table 11—that ranked hospitals are more likely to be found in urban 
areas, with large populations and higher than average poverty rates—holds up when we 
discover that, between the years of 2008 and 2011, of those hospitals located in the 100 
largest cities in the U.S., 418 are U.S. News-ranked and 4,137 are U.S. News-unranked. Being 
ranked by U.S. News was significantly correlated with being in a top-100 city (r = .2070, p < 
.001). 
 
Table 12: Hospital information from AHA for U.S. News ranked and unranked 
hospitals, 2008-2011: Results of two-sample t-test with unequal variances  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** p < .001 
 
 
Ranked by U.S. 
News 
Unranked by U.S. 
News 
Difference (t-
value) 
Population  1,555,894 people 583,939 people -12.2291*** 
Percent insured  83.8716% 82.3931% -5.5948*** 
Median income $52,808.55 $47,331.72 -11.0417*** 
Poverty rate 14.6357% 14.2318% -2.1021 
N 591 23,864 
 
Ranked by U.S. 
News 
Unranked by U.S. 
News  t-value 
Full-time 
equivalents 4,627 FTE 746 FTE 
27.0116*** 
Sole community 
provider 441 hospitals  18,288 hospitals 
16.8459*** 
Adjusted average 
daily census 692.2685 patients 164.9223 patients 
30.0385*** 
Number of beds 551.7496 beds 144.0916 beds 29.0052*** 
N 607 23,864 
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Table 12 shows that U.S. News-ranked hospitals have significantly more full-time 
equivalents, are significantly less likely to be the sole community provider, and have 
significantly more patients and beds. 
 
Table 13: Hospital Compare and U.S. News Best Hospitals, 2011: Results of two-
sample t-test with unequal variances  
 
 
Table 13 shows that perceived quality is not the same as actual quality, where U.S. 
News is perceived quality and actual quality is Medicare Hospital Compare. The U.S. News 
ranked hospitals also have higher daily censuses for patients coming through, and are 
presumably dealing with more complicated cases, which could hurt their mortality and 
readmission scores. Here are the 36 hospitals that were exceptional according to both lists. 
 
 
 
 
Total hospitals in 
the U.S. in 2011 4,655 hospitals 
Hospitals that 
perform well on 
both lists 
36 hospitals (0.77% of total hospitals; 33.33% of those 
ranked by U.S. News; 7.23% of those rated as “better than 
national average” by MHC)  
  
Hospitals ranked 
(by U.S. News) or 
“better than 
national average” 
(MHC) 
606 hospitals (13.02% of total hospitals) 
U.S. News 
Medicare 
Hospital 
Compare 
(MHC) 
108 hospitals (2.32% of total 
hospitals) 
498 hospitals 
(10.70% of total 
hospitals) 
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Table 14: Ranked by U.S. News, better than national average for Hospital Compare 
 
 
 
 
1 Abbott Northwestern Hospital 
2 Barnes-Jewish Hospital 
3 Baylor University Medical Center 
4 Beaumont Hospital 
5 Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center 
6 Brigham and Women’s Hospital 
7 Carolinas Medical Center 
8 Cedars-Sinai Medical Center 
9 Cleveland Clinic 
10 Cleveland Clinic Florida 
11 Emory University Hospital 
12 Florida Hospital Orlando 
13 Froedtert Hospital 
14 Hackensack University Medical Center 
15 Harper University Hospital 
16 Henry Ford Hospital 
17 Loyola University Medical Center 
18 Massachusetts General Hospital 
19 Mayo Clinic Hospital 
20 Memorial Hermann-Texas Medical Center 
21 Methodist Hospital 
22 Montefiore Medical Center 
23 Mount Sinai Medical Center 
24 New York-Presbyterian Hospital 
25 Northwestern Memorial Hospital 
26 NYU Langone Medical Center 
27 Ohio State University Hospital 
28 Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center 
29 Rush University Medical Center 
30 Scripps La Jolla Hospitals and Clinics 
31 Shands Hospital at the University of Florida 
32 Thomas Jefferson University Hospital 
33 University of Miami, Jackson Memorial Hospital 
34 University of Michigan Hospitals and Health Centers 
35 Washington Hospital Center 
36 Yale-New Haven Hospital 
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5.2.2 Survey: quality transparency 
The U.S. News Best Hospitals provides a high-level overview of the 
interaction between hospital quality and other factors in the U.S. I now present the 
quality aspect of the survey results. I describe briefly the ways in which the quality 
portion of the survey differed from the price portion, and then present the results. 
 
Figure 23: Summary of surveys 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), and 2(b) for quality 
transparency 
 
As shown in Figure 23, the quality surveys used two hospital quality websites: 
Medicare Hospital Compare and U.S. News Best Hospitals. 224 respondents were 
surveyed total. Survey 1 had 108 respondents total, while Survey 2 had 102 
respondents total. The results of Survey 1 showed that everyday consumers have 
difficulty making better healthcare decisions based on currently available information 
as it is presented to the public. Survey 2 quantified the impact of the metrics chosen 
to present healthcare pricing information.  
Information presentation
Internet source of quality 
information
Hospitals shown
University of Kansas Hospital
Via Christi Hospital
Medicare Hospital 
Compare
Survey 1(a) 
Screenshots 
of website
Survey 2(a)
Tables
U.S. News Best 
Hospitals
Survey 1(a) 
Screenshots 
of website
Survey 2(a)
Tables
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The first survey consisted of versions 1(a) and 1(b) to allow comparison of 
consumer decisions when presented with different websites providing information 
on the same hospitals. One of the websites searched was U.S. News Best Hospitals, a 
private ranking initiative. The other website searched was Medicare Hospital 
Compare, which is administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
Including screenshots of websites was intended to simulate the process by which 
consumers would access information on their own when preparing to make a real life 
healthcare decision.  
Beyond conveying the price information itself, the use of screenshots 
retained the visual presentation of information of each website and the amount of 
information presented. Respondents were provided with some background 
information on the website, as demonstrated in Figure 5. For example, as shown in 
Figure 5, Survey 1(a) described Hospital Compare as a website run by the federal 
government that provides information on healthcare quality.  
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Figure 24: Excerpt from Survey 1(a): Quality information from Hospital 
Compare (screenshot)
 
 
Quality transparency survey: Do respondents choose the higher quality 
option? 
 
In Survey 1(a), 55 respondents were presented with quality information on 
University of Kansas Hospital and Via Christi Hospital. They were shown quality 
information from Hospital Compare, the federal website. The higher quality choice 
was University of Kansas. Respondents were asked to assume that the hospitals were 
of equal cost. 
In response to Survey 1(a), a majority of respondents selected the better 
choice, University of Kansas Hospital (38 respondents, constituting 69.09% of the 
sample). A single sample two-tailed t-test was performed on Survey 1(a) to determine 
whether this figure was statistically significant. The percentage of respondents 
choosing the cheapest hospital was determined to be statistically significant at a 
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confidence level of 99.99% (t = 3.0371, p = 0.0036). More people selected University 
of Kansas than the null hypothesis of an even distribution could accommodate. 
In Survey 1(b), 53 respondents were presented with quality information on 
University of Kansas Hospital and Via Christi Hospital through U.S. News Best 
Hospital rankings. The better choice was very clear. University of Kansas outranked 
Via Christi on every count. In response to Survey 1(b), a majority of respondents 
selected University of Kansas Hospital (43 respondents, constituting 81% of the 
sample).  
In response to Survey 1(b), a majority of respondents selected the higher-
quality choice, University of Kansas Hospital (43 respondents, constituting 81.13% 
of the sample). A single sample two-tailed t-test was performed on Survey 1(b) to 
determine whether this figure was statistically significant. The percentage of 
respondents choosing the higher quality hospital was determined to be statistically 
significant at a confidence level of 99.99% (t = 5.7319, p < 0.00001). More people 
selected University of Kansas than the null hypothesis of an even distribution could 
accommodate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 116
Figure 25: Excerpt from Survey 1(b): Quality information from U.S. News 
Best Hospitals (screenshot) 
 
Analysis of the survey results focused on whether respondents selected the 
hospital with the highest quality, when choosing based on quality. Secondary analysis 
focused on whether propensity to make the best decision was predicted by any 
particular factors, as collected by demographic and other informational questions in 
survey. 
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Table 15: Surveys 1(a) and 1(b) for quality: Results of two-tailed Student t-test  
 1(a) 1(b) Difference 
Higher quality 
choice 
38 (69%) 43 (81%) 5 (12%)† 
N  55 53 
† Not significant at the 0.05 probability level 
 
As Table 19 shows, materials in Survey 1(b) were better than those in Survey 
1(a) at leading consumers to make the optimal choice, but not significantly so (t = -
1.444, p = .1518).  
Now let us move on to Survey 2. In Survey 2(a), 52 respondents were 
presented with quality information on University of Kansas Hospital (Hospital A) 
and Via Christi Hospital (Hospital B). They were shown quality information 
extracted from Hospital Compare, but presented in table format. The better choice 
was Via Christi Hospital, because it was shown to be higher quality than the 
University of Kansas Hospital for the metrics presented. Respondents were asked to 
assume that the hospitals were of equal cost.  
 Figure 26: Excerpt from 
Compare (extracted)
In response to Survey 2(a), a majority of respondents selected Hospital B 
(Via Christi Hospital; 33 respondents, constituting 63% of the sample). 
sample two-tailed t-test was perf
figure was statistically significant. The percentage of respondents choosing the 
cheapest hospital was determined to be statistically significant at a confidence level 
of 99.9% (t = 2.0023, p = 
than the null hypothesis of an even distribution could accommodate.
In Survey 2(b), 50 
University of Kansas Hospital and Via Christi Hospital 
and World Report rankings
clear. University of Kansas outranked Via Christi on every count
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Survey 2(a): Quality information from Hospital 
A single 
ormed on Survey 2(a) to determine whether this 
0.0506). More people selected the higher quality option
 
respondents were presented with quality information on 
extracted from U.S. News 
 and presented in table form. The better choice was very 
.  
 
 
 Figure 27: Excerpt from Survey 2(b): Quality information from 
Best Hospitals (extracted)
 
In response to Survey 2(b), a majority of respondents selected 
quality option (48 respondents, constituting 
two-tailed t-test was performed on Survey 2(b
statistically significant. The percentage of respondents choosing the cheapest hospital 
was determined to be statistically significant at a confidence level of 99.9
16.436, p < 0.00001). More people selected the higher quality option
hypothesis of an even distribution could accommodate.
Primary analysis of the survey results focused on whether respondents 
selected the hospital with the highest quality
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propensity to make the best decision was predicted by any particular factors, as 
collected by demographic and other informational questions in survey. 
Table 16: Surveys 2(a) and 2(b) for quality: Results of two-tailed Student t-test  
 2(a) 2(b) Difference 
Cheapest choice 33 (63%) 48 (96%) 15 (33%)*** 
N  52 50 
***p < .001 
 
As we can see in Table 20, the tables presented in Survey 2(b) were 
significantly better than those in Survey 2(a) at leading consumers to choose the 
better option (t = 4.3941, p = .000028). 
Respondents to Survey 2 outperformed respondents to Survey 1, but not by 
a statistically significant amount (t = -0.7573; p = 0.4498), as shown in Table 21. 
 
Table 17: Surveys 1 and 2 for quality: Results of two-tailed Student t-test  
 1(a&b) 2(a&b) Difference 
Highest quality 
choice 
81 (75%) 81 (79%) 0 (4%)† 
N  108 102 
† Not significant at 0.05 probability level 
 
Quality transparency survey: Who was more likely to choose the higher 
quality option? 
 
Analysis of the survey results first focused on whether respondents selected 
the hospital with the highest quality, when choosing based on quality, and with the 
lowest price, when choosing based on price. Secondary analysis focused on whether 
propensity to make the better decision was predicted by any particular factors, as 
collected by demographic and other informational questions in survey. I considered 
the same factors I did with price, but now in relation to information about quality. I 
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found similar results—none of the characteristics of respondents were significantly 
predictive of their responses. 
Examining political affiliation across all surveys, one sees that Republicans 
were not significantly more likely than those of any other political affiliation to 
choose the higher quality option at a confidence level of 95% (t = 0.2532; p = 0.5). 
Of respondents, 78.43% of Republicans (n = 51) and 76.73% of non-Republicans (n 
= 159) selected the higher quality option. 
Examining gender across all surveys, one sees that women were no more 
likely than men to choose the higher quality option at a confidence level of 95% (t = 
-0.3558; p = 0.5). 76.15% of women (n = 109) and 78.22% of men (n = 101) selected 
the higher quality option. (As with the sections on price, one of the respondents to 
the surveys identified as “other,” though all were given the option.) 
Those with graduate degrees (JD, MBA, MPH, Ph.D., or other) were no 
more likely than those without to choose the higher quality option at a confidence 
level of 95% (t = -0.478; p = 0.5). Across all of the surveys, 74.47% of those with 
graduate degrees (n = 47) and 77.91% of those without graduate degrees (n = 163) 
selected the higher quality option.  
Those with higher annual household incomes were statistically no more likely 
than those without to choose the higher quality option at a confidence level of 95% 
(t = 1.1977; p = 0.5). 82.26% of those with annual household incomes equal to or 
greater than $60,000 (n = 62) and 75.00% of those with annual household incomes 
less than $60,000 (n = 148) selected the higher quality option.  
Those employed in healthcare were not statistically more likely to choose the 
higher quality option at a confidence level of 95% (t = 0.277; p = 0.3922). Across all 
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of the surveys, 80.00% of those employed in healthcare (n = 15) and 76.92% of 
those not employed in healthcare (n = 195) selected the higher quality option.  
Those with family or friends employed in healthcare were not statistically 
more likely to choose the higher quality option at a confidence level of 95% (t = -
0.6546; p = 0.5). Across all of the surveys, 75.24% of those with family or close 
friends employed in healthcare (n = 105) and 79.05% of those without (n = 105) 
selected the higher quality option. (Respondents who declined to answer the 
question were counted as not having close friends or family members employed in 
healthcare.)  
 
5.3 Chapter conclusion 
 
In the previous section, I presented the results of the surveys as pertain to 
quality transparency. In this chapter as a whole, I have analyzed the usefulness of 
current information available to consumers. The survey evidence about both price 
and quality supports my claim in Chapters 3 and 4 that recent reforms have not gone 
far enough to prompt demand-driven improvements in healthcare delivery. First, in 
four survey experiments to determine the impact of information on decision-making, 
consumers were more likely to choose the lower cost or higher quality option when 
relevant information was presented in straightforward ways with a minimized risk of 
information overload (n = 224, t = -3.7065, p < 0.0002). Second, hospitals on the 
U.S. News Best Hospital list between 2008 and 2011 were shown to be significantly 
more likely to be found in wealthy, highly populated areas, while unranked hospitals 
were more likely to be the sole community provider. Third, perceived quality (U.S. 
News-ranked hospitals) was shown to be out of alignment with actual quality 
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(hospitals performing above the national average for readmission and mortality 
according to Medicare Hospital Compare): 36 hospitals performed well on both lists, 
constituting only 0.77% of total hospitals in the U.S. in 2011. In the next chapter, I 
draw together these components of analysis to show that fears held by economists 
and private sector participants will likely not be realized in the near future—but 
neither will the hopes of policymakers for demand-driven change in the healthcare 
system.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
Assumptions about marketplace participants impact the design of healthcare 
systems. Chapter 2 argued that patient behavior is best understood through the lens 
of bounded rationality. Chapters 3 and 4 presented the current state of affairs for 
price and quality transparency in the U.S. hospital market, suggesting that 
transparency efforts have been hindered by assumption that consumers behave 
according to full economic rationality. Chapter 5 critically analyzed price-paid and 
quality information currently available to the public, presenting survey results and 
analysis of the U.S. News Best Hospital rankings for the years 2001 through 2014.  
It might make sense to combine cost and quality and incentivize value 
through capitation and other links of payment to quality. However, given the 
information in the following table, hospitals ranked by U.S. News Best Hospitals 
have a significantly lower percentage of their net patient revenue paid on a capitated 
basis. 
Table 18: Hospital information from AHA for U.S. News ranked and 
unranked hospitals with some percentage of net patient revenue paid on 
capitated basis, 2008-2011: Results of two-sample t-test with unequal variances  
*** p < .001 
 
 
 
Ranked by U.S. 
News 
Unranked by U.S. 
News  t-value 
Percentage of net 
patient revenue 
paid on capitated 
basis 4.6667% 10.2561% 
6.1087*** 
N 81  1,109 
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Furthermore, as Table 19 shows, hospitals ranked by U.S. News Best 
Hospitals have fewer patient lives covered under capitation (although not 
significantly fewer). 
 
Table 19: Hospital information from AHA for U.S. News ranked and 
unranked hospitals with some number of patient lives covered under a 
capitated basis, 2008-2011: Results of two-sample t-test with unequal variances  
† Not significant at the 0.05 probability level 
 
 
Finally, in Table 20, we see that U.S. News-ranked hospitals have a lower 
percentage of net patient revenue paid on a shared risk basis (although not 
significantly so). 
 
Table 20: Hospital information from AHA for U.S. News ranked and 
unranked hospitals with some percentage of net patient revenue paid on 
shared risk basis, 2008-2011: Results of two-sample t-test with unequal 
variances  
† Not significant at the 0.05 probability level 
 
Despite this cautionary evidence, linking prices to quality does have promise, 
although it runs the risk of stifling the private sector. We are seeking to achieve some 
 
Ranked by U.S. 
News 
Unranked by U.S. 
News  t-value 
Number of lives 
covered under 
capitation 45,971 lives 54,808 lives 
0.3739† 
N 81  924 
 
Ranked by U.S. 
News 
Unranked by U.S. 
News  t-value 
Percentage of net 
patient revenue 
paid on shared risk 
basis 10.6667% 17.4580% 
1.2322† 
N 63  845 
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just allocation of resources, by using the best parts respectively of the political 
process and market dynamics.  
This thesis presented the case for transparency as a demand-side and supply-
side solution to the problems of high costs and low quality in the U.S. healthcare 
market. It highlighted the main risks of transparency, including the threat of 
collusion leading to higher prices across the board. Ethically and economically, our 
policies must seek to maximize quality and minimize cost across the board, while 
balancing feasibility considerations. Moving forward politically, we ought to continue 
building consensus on these issues, since they are serving as a point of reasonable 
bipartisan and stakeholder compromise. 
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Appendix 
A.1 States with price transparency websites: state-mandated and voluntary 
 
As of 2013, 34 states require some type of price transparency disclosures to the 
public, and more are in the works (Coluni, 2012). Yet, these laws are inconsistent 
among states. This table shows state-mandated and voluntary websites (Delbanco, 
2014).  
 
State with price 
transparency websites 
State-mandated 
website 
Voluntary 
website 
Arizona   
Arkansas X  
California X  
Colorado X  
Delaware   
Florida X  
Illinois X  
Indiana  X 
Iowa X  
Kentucky X  
Louisiana X X 
Maine X  
Maryland   X 
Massachusetts X  
Michigan   X 
Minnesota X X 
Montana   X 
Nebraska   X 
Nevada X X 
New Hampshire X X 
New Jersey   X 
New York   X 
North Carolina  X X 
Ohio X  
Oregon  X 
Pennsylvania  X 
Rhode Island   
South Carolina  X 
South Dakota X  
Tennessee  X 
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Texas  X 
Utah X X 
Virginia X X 
Vermont X  
Washington  X 
Wisconsin X  
Wyoming  X 
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A.2 Maryland Hospital Association quality measures 
 
 2007 2013 2014 
Percentage of 
years present 
Heart attack X X X 100% 
Heart failure X X X 100% 
Pneumonia X X X 100% 
Surgical infection 
prevention X   33% 
Surgical care  X X 66% 
Patient satisfaction  X X 66% 
Children’s asthma  X X 66% 
Medical imaging   X 33% 
Emergency 
department care   X 33% 
Preventative care   X 33% 
Healthcare 
associated infections   X 33% 
Stroke care   X 33% 
Blood clot 
prevention   X 33% 
30-day outcomes   X 33% 
 
Note: All information to create this table was gathered by using Internet Archive 
Wayback Machine to peruse older versions of the Maryland Hospital Association 
quality measures website. The versions used were archived on: June 29, 2007; 
February 14, 2013; and November 19, 2014. 
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A.3 WCHQ quality measures 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Percentage 
of years 
present 
Provider type 
Physician/ 
medical group X X X X X X X X X X 100% 
Hospital X X X X X X X X X X 100% 
Health plan X X X X X X X X X  89% 
Clinic       X X X X 44% 
Institute of 
Medicine 
categories 
and 
improvement 
aims 
Safety X X X X X X     66% 
Timeliness X X X X X X     66% 
Effectiveness X X X X X X X    78% 
Patient-
centeredness X X X X X X X    78% 
Efficiency  X X X X X X    78% 
Clinical topic 
Access X X X X X X     66% 
Critical care X X X X X X     66% 
Diabetes X X X X X X X X X X 100% 
Health 
information 
technology X X X X X X     66% 
Heart care X X X X X X X X X X 100% 
Patient 
satisfaction X X X X X X     66% 
Pneumonia X X X X X X X X X X 100% 
Surgery X X X X X X X X   89% 
Women’s 
health X X X X X X X X X X 100% 
Hypertension  X         11% 
Patient 
experience       X X X X 44% 
Cardiac       X X X X 44% 
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surgery 
Cardiovascular 
specialty care         X X 22% 
Ambulatory 
Care 
Measures 
Chronic care  X X X X X X X X X 89% 
Episodic care  X X X X X     56% 
Preventative 
care  X X X X X X X X X 89% 
WCHQ 
population 
results    X X X X X    56% 
WCHQ 
measures 
summary         X X  22% 
Resource use 
measures: 
hospital 
efficiency         X X  22% 
 
Note: All information to create this table was gathered by using Internet Archive Wayback Machine to peruse older versions 
of the WCHQ website (web address: wchq.org/reporting). The versions used were archived on: April 12, 2005; February 2, 
2006; June 23, 2007; July 9, 2008; November 3, 2009; June 13, 2010; April 10, 2011; July 23, 2012; September 8, 2013; and 
November 19, 2014. 
 132
A.4 New Hampshire HealthCost price measures 
 
The New Hampshire Insurance Department released HealthCost version 2 on 
February 28, 2007, using a substantially different methodology and presentation than 
pilot version 1 (NHID, 2009). Data were not available in the NHCHIS for dates 
prior to January 1, 2005. October 1 is the beginning of the fiscal year for many NH 
hospitals, so this is when price changes take place. As of 2009, the procedures 
included for each year in HealthCost were as follows:  
• Destruction of lesion 
• Arthrocentesis 
• Arthroscopic knee surgery 
• Tonsillectomy with adenoidectomy 
• Colonoscopy 
• Hernia repair 
• MRIs: Brain, back, pelvis, knee 
• X-rays: Chest, spine, shoulder, wrist, knee, ankle, foot 
• CT scans: Chest, pelvis, abdomen 
• Bone density scan 
• Mammogram 
• Ultrasound: Breast, pregnancy, pelvic 
• Myocardial imaging 
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A.5 Medicare Severity Diagnostic Related Group (MS-DRG): Examples for FY 2014 
 
LIST OF MEDICARE SEVERITY DIAGNOSIS-RELATED GROUPS (MS-DRGS), RELATIVE 
WEIGHTING FACTORS, AND GEOMETRIC AND ARITHMETIC MEAN LENGTH OF STAY—FY 2014 
Final Rule 
MS-
DR
G  
FY 
2014 
FR 
Post-
Acute 
DRG 
FY 2014 
FR 
Special 
Pay 
DRG MDC 
TYP
E MS-DRG Title Weights 
Geometri
c mean 
LOS 
Arithmeti
c mean 
LOS 
001 No No PRE 
SUR
G 
HEART TRANSPLANT OR 
IMPLANT OF HEART ASSIST 
SYSTEM W MCC 25.3518 28.3 35.9 
002 No No PRE 
SUR
G 
HEART TRANSPLANT OR 
IMPLANT OF HEART ASSIST 
SYSTEM W/O MCC 15.2738 15.9 18.6 
003 Yes No PRE 
SUR
G 
ECMO OR TRACH W MV 96+ 
HRS OR PDX EXC FACE, 
MOUTH & NECK W MAJ O.R. 17.6369 27.2 33.2 
004 Yes No PRE 
SUR
G 
TRACH W MV 96+ HRS OR 
PDX EXC FACE, MOUTH & 
NECK W/O MAJ O.R. 10.9288 20.3 24.7 
005 No No PRE 
SUR
G 
LIVER TRANSPLANT W MCC 
OR INTESTINAL 
TRANSPLANT 10.4214 15.1 20.1 
006 No No PRE 
SUR
G 
LIVER TRANSPLANT W/O 
MCC 4.7639 7.9 9.0 
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This table represents just the first six rows of the FY 2014 Final Rule Table 5 released by CMS, which continues through 
MS-DRG 999. The table lists MS-DRGs, relative weighting factors, and geometric and arithmetic mean length of stay 
(CMS, 2013a). 
A.6 Medicare Severity Diagnostic Related Group (MS-DRG) Reimbursement Rates: Example 
 
 
The table shows final FY2014 MS-DRG national average payment rates for select cardiovascular procedures and the 
percent change as compared to FY2013 MS-DRG final national average rates. The rates and percent changes shown are 
base payments. Actual rates may vary for individual hospitals due to geographic wage differences (Scientific, 2013). 
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A.7 Hospital Chargemaster: Example 
 
CDM1 Description 
Standard 
Charge 
Surgery 
Center/Proced
ure Room 
Charge 
L&D 
Charge 
Pharm 
Charge 
Per 
Dose 
Pharm 
Supply 
Charge 
Range 
49000025
00 
HB  PROCEDURE ROOM 
HOURS 0.25 1,530.00 370.00       
72000100
10 
HB  LABOR ROOM TIME 
PER 1 HOUR 392.00 280.00       
72007200
15 
HB  LABOR ROOM TIME 
EA ADD 15MIN 98.00 70.00       
12500214 
HB  TISSUE 
DECALCIFICATION 60.00         
36001050
00 HB OR HOURS 10.50 26,364.00   
20,882.
00     
12714348 
HB USTEKINUMAB 
SYRINGE 90MG  
USTE90SYR       
32,801.
22   
27831755
00 HB CATH INTRASPINAL         
999 - 
3296.7 
 
The table shows a sample of chargemaster entries from Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center in 2014, acquired from the 
State of California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD, 2015).  
1 CDM stands for “charge description master,” which is often shortened to “chargemaster.” In the CDM column are the 
codes specific to different procedures in Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center’s chargemaster. 
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A.8 Practice guideline: Example 
What follows is an excerpt from the American Psychiatric Association’s Practice 
Guideline for the treatment of patients with bipolar disorder, to provide an example 
of a practice guideline (Association, 2010). 
 
 A.9 Survey 2(a): Full 
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A.10 Evidence of Mount Sinai Health System getting out the vote for U.S. 
News rankings (emails) 
 
From: Broadcast Communications 
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2014 11:16 AM 
Subject: Alert from the Dean’s Office Regarding Paper Ballots for U.S. News & 
World Report Reputation Surveys 
TO:                 Faculty, Staff, and Students 
FROM:           Kenneth L. Davis, MD 
                        Chief Executive Officer and President 
                        Mount Sinai Health System 
  
                        Dennis S. Charney, MD, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Dean 
                        Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai 
                        President for Academic Affairs, Mount Sinai Health System 
  
DATE:           February 10, 2014 
RE: Alert from the Dean’s Office Regarding Paper Ballots for U.S. News & 
World Report Reputation Surveys 
  
U.S. News & World Report recently mailed paper ballots for its annual “Best 
Hospitals” and “Best Pediatric Hospitals” surveys to physicians around the 
country. The paper ballots are tabulated to determine reputational scores for U.S. 
News rankings.  
  
If you have received a paper ballot pertaining to the Best Hospitals or Best Pediatric 
Hospitals rankings, please notify the office of Dennis S. Charney, MD, Anne and 
Joel Ehrenkranz Dean of the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai. We want to 
be sure that all physicians who received these ballots fill them out. 
  
The ballots for the Best Hospitals survey were sent by first-class mail to a random 
selection of 200 board certified specialists across the United States in each of the 16 
specialties that are ranked. The ballots for the Pediatric survey were mailed to 150 
specialists in each of the 10 pediatric fields that are ranked.  
  
Between January 2 and 31, U.S. News emailed the intended recipients of the paper 
ballots to let them know they would be receiving them. The email appeared with the 
subject line: “Nominations for U.S. News Best Hospitals Rankings.” 
  
Please check your mail carefully to see if you have received a ballot, or search your 
Mount Sinai, MSSM, or other personal and professional email accounts for the 
subject line of “Nominations for U.S. News Best Hospital Rankings,” to see if you 
were notified. You can also search by the sender’s address which 
wasBestHospitals@rti.org or MedIntel@hcpconnects.com.  
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The ballot asks you to list up to five U.S. hospitals that provide the best inpatient 
care for challenging medical or surgical conditions in your specialty. U.S. News uses 
the ballots to derive the reputational index for its rankings methodology. Other 
factors include Structure, Process, and Outcomes. The factors are weighted 
differently across specialty areas.  
  
For the first time this year, U.S. News has partnered with Doximity.com to conduct 
an online reputational survey that is being used in conjunction with the paper ballots 
for the “Best Hospitals” overall reputational rankings index. The Doximity survey is 
not being used for the “Best Pediatrics Hospitals” rankings this year. 
  
The ballot period will close in mid-April. The rankings for “Best Pediatric Hospitals” 
will be published in mid-June, and “Best Hospitals” will be published in mid-July.  
  
We appreciate your assistance in ensuring that the Mount Sinai Health System is fully 
represented in the nomination process.  
 
 
From: Broadcast Communications 
Sent: Friday, February 13, 2015 2:54 PM 
Subject: U.S. News & World Report Opens Online Voting for the “Best Hospitals” 
and “Best Pediatric Hospitals” Rankings 
TO:               All Faculty and Staff 
  
FROM:         Kenneth L. Davis, MD 
                      Chief Executive Officer and President 
                      Mount Sinai Health System 
  
                      Dennis S. Charney, MD 
                      Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Dean 
                      Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai 
                      President for Academic Affairs 
                      Mount Sinai Health System 
  
DATE:          February 13, 2015 
  
RE:                U.S. News & World Report Opens Online Voting for the “Best 
Hospitals” and “Best Pediatric Hospitals” Rankings 
  
Online voting is now open via Doximity.com for the 2015 U.S. News & World 
Report “Best Hospitals” and “Best Pediatric Hospitals” rankings. Sixteen clinical 
specialties and ten pediatric specialties will be ranked in 2015/16. 
 
All eligible adult and pediatric physicians who activated their Doximity account in 
December, 2014, will have the opportunity to vote within their board-certified 
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specialty. Eligible physicians can log on to Doximity.com at any time to take the 
survey. Additionally, Doximity will be sending eligible physicians an invitation to take 
the survey with reminder invitations to follow over the next few weeks, from either a 
.doximity.com or .doximity.org server. We encourage you to vote before the 
February 27 deadline, and support the increased rankings of individual Mount Sinai 
hospitals. Results will be published in July, 2015. 
 
U.S. News & World Report made a significant change to its reputation-scoring 
methodology last year by teaming with Doximity to collect online votes for adult 
specialties. Last year, slightly more than 8,000 online votes by Doximity members 
were included in the calculation for adult hospital rankings. This was combined with 
the 3,200 printed surveys mailed to board-certified physicians. 
 
For pediatrics, 1,500 printed ballots were mailed out, but an online Doximity survey 
was not available at that time. The addition of online voting for pediatrics in 2015 is 
surely a great benefit that will add validity to the reputation scorings. 
 
Doximity.com is a free, online professional network for U.S. physicians. Of the 
network’s more than 300,000 members, at least 200,000 currently meet the criteria to 
vote online in the U.S. News rankings. All Doximity votes will count toward the U.S. 
News reputation score, adjusted for accurate representation among hospitals 
nationwide. 
 
In prior years, survey-eligible physicians were identified through the American 
Medical Association Masterfile. This year, U.S. News will be employing the Doximity 
Masterfile, which includes every physician who appears in the U.S. NewsDoctor 
Finder. 
 
In the unlikely instance that you receive a printed ballot in the mail after you have 
already voted online, please make sure to fill it out and submit the printed ballot as 
well. 
 
If you did not activate your Doximity account by December 5, 2014, you should still 
register on Doximity.com so you are eligible to vote next year.   
 
Thank you for your continued commitment to advancing both the outstanding 
patient care of the Mount Sinai Health System, and the innovative education 
provided by the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai. 
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